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Abstract
This article summarizes key findings of a quantitative and qualitative analysis of media-
oriented hostage takings involving local people and foreigners in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and Saudi Arabia during a five-year period (01-01-2004 to 12-31-2008). Based on a long-
term tracking of Islamist online publications, the chosen approach did not only allow to 
identify static values, but also granted insights into developments over time. Characteristic 
patterns regarding responsible organizations, nationalities of victims, distribution channels 
for hostage media, etc. could in this way be identified.  The kidnappers' organizational 
affiliation turned out to be the most significant variable. It decisively affected other factors 
like number of abductions, likelihood of fatal outcome or duration of a kidnapping. As a 
consequence, the highest attention should be given to  this parameter when dealing with 
hostage situations. Another key finding is that insurgents have been increasingly refraining 
from broadcasting visual representations of extreme violence. This article is based on the 
German-language dissertation J. Tinnes. “Internetnutzung islamistischer Terror- und 
Insurgentengruppen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von medialen Geiselnahmen im Irak, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan und Saudi-Arabien” -  in English: “Internet Usage of Islamist 
Terrorist and Insurgent Groups with Special Regard for Media-oriented Hostage Takings in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia”).[1] In the following I shall summarize key 
findings in order to make them accessible to non-German speaking readers.
Introduction
In the 21st century, the Internet has established itself as a leading medium for the distribution 
of terrorist messages. As a communication strategy, terrorism is dependent on a dissemination 
of its deeds by the mass media to be able to unfold its full psychological effect. [2] Jihadists 
and their sympathizers have recognized that the Internet – due to its power to realize a more 
even playing ground than hierarchical one-way media – is an excellent medium for a new 
form of warfare: Electronic Jihad (E-Jihad). This is especially true for terrorist hostage takers 
who are using the stage of the world to play their theater of terror. [3] The choreography of 
their kidnapping operations fulfills all needs of high-drama theater as noted by Gabriel 
Weimann and Conrad Winn: “script preparation, cast selection, sets, props, role playing, and 
minute-by-minute stage management” [4] The strategy of kidnapping is particularly well 
suited for getting an extraordinary media attention. Most hostage takings last for a prolonged 
period during which they unfold a dramatic potential. While bombings, suicide attacks, sniper 
operations and other terrorist strategies are often anti-climatic and are usually only reported 
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normally starts at a moment when the terrorist activity is still ongoing and the result of the 
kidnapping drama is open-ended. The uncertainty about the fate of a hostage creates suspense 
– the key ingredient for a sensational infotainment story likely to capture the attention of 
large audiences. This explains why kidnappings have become established as a mass-
phenomenon in conflict zones with high terrorist activity such as Iraq or the Afghanistan-
Pakistan (AfPak) region.
Methodology
In my dissertation, I have conducted a quantitative and qualitative analysis of media-oriented 
hostage takings of local people and foreigners in four countries. My working definition is 
derived from Crelinsten and Szabo [5]: 
A hostage taking is a form of extortion, during which a militant organization seizes 
one or more persons and holds them at an undisclosed location to achieve political, 
financial, or psychological goals.
By media-oriented hostage takings I understand kidnappings during which media 
publications (videos, images, audio statements) were released. Media-oriented hostage 
takings tend to get a high level of attention from mass media and play an often decisive role. 
Minwoo Yun  has observed that“….this area of study has suffered a shortage of quantitative 
data and corresponding analyses. Thus, most studies and articles on this topic have been 
descriptive and narrative.“ [6] I therefore tied to arrive at concrete numbers and percentage 
values for media-oriented kidnappings. By using numerical results, characteristic patterns 
(e.g. responsible groups, nationalities of victims, forms of used violence) could be visualized, 
from which actionable knowledge for decision-makers involved in future acts of hostage-
taking might be derived. Practical information on the identity and nationality of kidnappers 
and their victims as well as ideology, aims, modus operandi and demands of terrorist groups 
can assist policy-makers confronted with a kidnapping crisis. 
Due to the high number of kidnapping cases worldwide, this analysis was limited to a five-
year period (January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2008). Geographically, it was confined to Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The year 2004 was selected as entry point because it 
marked the beginning of a kidnapping wave in Iraq; many of these were very media-oriented 
hostage takings. Afghanistan and Pakistan were chosen because similar abduction waves 
emerged. The insurgents from the AfPak region often used reports on the nefarious activities 
of their Iraqi brethren as a blue print. Saudi Arabia was included in my sample for reasons of 
contrasting: while, on the one hand, the situation in the Saudi Kingdom showed clear 
parallels to the kidnapping wave in Iraq (existence of an Al-Qaeda branch, kidnapping and 
attack wave in 2004), Saudi Arabia is a country with more stable political structures – hence 
insurgents could not gain ground to the same extent they managed to do in the other three 
nations examined here. A special focus of my analysis was on non-Western victims since they 
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to counteract this selective tendency and offer an analysis that is as inclusive and integrated 
as possible in the current data situation.
The basis of the data survey was a long-term tracking of Islamist Internet presences – which I 
have been conducting since early 2006 – as well as a retrospective survey for the years 2004 
and 2005, using media reports. During three years, relevant Islamist online presences were 
searched for new publications on a daily basis and all relevant material was archived. In 
addition, secondary sources like online news outlets, websites of experts and institutions in 
the terrorism research field as well as topic-related discussion forums like Clearinghouse 
Infovlad and Terroristmedia were used. The information gathered was sorted, aggregated and 
condensed in the form of data tables. [7]
For the years 2004/2005, only hostage takings with at least one fatality could be taken into 
account due to the fact that the daily long-term tracking started only in 2006; events in earlier 
years had to be researched retrospectively based on media reports. A practical consideration 
was that incidents during which people are killed are rather more often reported by the 
mainstream media than those without any fatality. [8] As most Western mainstream media 
tend to disregard or ignore non-Western hostages – especially if there are no fatalities – a 
retrospective analysis exclusively based on secondary sources would have produced only 
partial results. Hence, the 2004/2005 data survey for the analysis was restricted to those 
newsworthy hostage takings involving fatalities. Because of the different survey approaches, 
I split the data in two different sets to allow for greater accuracy. The first set (Corpus 1 / 
below: C1) contains hostage cases with fatalities from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 
2008. The second set (Corpus 2 / below: C2) comprises not only kidnappings with fatalities 
(in which it overlaps with C1) but also abductions with other possible outcomes (hostages 
freed, fates of captives unknown) for the period January 1, 2006, to December 31, 2008.
The assembled data were analyzed with the help of simple descriptive statistical methods. 
What follows are my key findings.
Results
Number of Hostage Takings and Hostages
Between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2008, a total of 178 kidnappings with fatalities 
was recorded (C1). All told, during those incidents, 545 persons were seized. In the period 
from January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2008, there were 107 abductions (involving 373 
persons), in which the victims were eventually either killed or freed; in some cases their fate 
remains unknown (C2). On average, there were three (3.0) kidnappings every month (C1 and 
C2). Figure 1 shows that the monthly number of hostage takings during the analyzed period 
was fluctuating. Experts have come to the conclusion that the abduction rate underlies 
rhythms and cycles. Such dynamics can not only be observed with kidnappings but also occur 
with other forms of terrorist activities. [9] Conducting attacks at a symbolically ‘loaded’ point 
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attack. Experts have attributed the abrupt start of the kidnapping wave in Iraq in April 2004 to 
the U.S. military engagement in the unrest city of Falluja, which started April 4th. Reacting to 
the military operation, insurgents began to kidnap foreigners to dissuade the country of origin 
of the hostages from joining the ‘coalition of the willing' or – if they already belonged to it – 
to raise their troop levels. The abduction wave culminated in a rush of kidnappings in the 
month of October. A catalyst for this development could have been the holy month of 
Ramadan, during which Jihadists tend to increase their attacks. Yet with regard to hostage 
takings, this assumption is problematic; no clear correlation between the abduction rate and 
the holy month of Ramadan could be observed in the following years.
Figure 1: Hostage Takings 2004-2008: Month-per-Month Abduction Rate
Motivated by high media attention, many armed groups soon adopted hostage-taking as a 
strategy, triggering a wave of kidnappings. Thomas Hegghammer called it
a classic case of 'contagion', i.e. terrorist actors learning from one another [...] Put 
simply, the introduction of the abduction tactic by certain groups at the outbreak of 
the Falluja crisis most likely inspired other insurgents groups and militias to adopt the 
same tactic, thus creating a snowball effect or 'epidemic' [10]
One example for a correlation between the abduction rate and symbolic events are the 
parliamentary elections in Iraq on January 30, 2005. In the weeks prior to the elections, 
insurgents launched a series of attacks against voters, polling stations, election workers and 
candidates [11] to avoid the establishment of a democracy – a political system which, 
according to their purist interpretation of Islam, runs counter to proper Islamic ruling because 
of its principle of man-made law (instead of God-given law). Three of the abducted persons 
shown in January 2005 hostage videos had been directly involved in the election process. Ten 
of the hostages executed on-camera during that month were killed in broad daylight on busy 
streets. Observers regarded this brazen action as a carefully crafted strategy of psychological 
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the Iraqi government. 
In 2008, with a total of only two (C1), respectively six (C2) abductions, the kidnapping rate 
reached its lowest level to date. On average, 0.2 (C1), respectively, 0.5 (C2) abductions 
occurred per month. This positive development can be mainly attributed to the improvement 
of the security situation in Iraq.
Location of Hostage Takings
The bulk of recorded kidnappings took place in Iraq. 167 (93.8%) of the incidents recorded in 
C1 and 91 (85.1%) of the cases in C2 happened in Mesopotamia. The other examined 
countries played only a secondary role:
•	
 Afghanistan: C1: 5 kidnappings (2.8%) / C2: 8 kidnappings (7.5%)
•	
 Pakistan: C1:  3 kidnappings (1.7%) / C2: 6 kidnappings (5.6%)
•	
 AfPak frontier region [12]: C1: 2 kidnappings (1.1%) / C2: 2 kidnappings (1.9%)
•	
 Saudi Arabia: C1: 1 kidnapping (0.6%) / C2: 1 kidnapping (0.9%)
Hence, only 5.6% of the abductions in C1 and 15.0% in C2 took place in the AfPak region. In 
Saudi Arabia, only a single hostage taking – belonging to both data sets – was recorded. This 
low number can be attributed to the stable security situation in the Kingdom, where 
successful counter-terrorism operations by the security apparatus prevented the insurgents 
from gaining a foothold.
If one looks at the geographic location of acts of hostage taking, one can see that, on the one 
hand, Afghanistan and Pakistan have begun to play a growing role in  kidnappings (see figure 
2). This is due to the facts that the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban movements have been 
gaining momentum and are taking over the media tactics of their Iraqi brethren. On the other 
hand, it is important to point out that the abduction activities in those nations have never 
reached the volume of Iraq – at least so far.
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While in the years 2004, 2005, and 2006, more than 95% of the recorded abductions took 
place in Mesopotamia (C1), Iraq has lost in significance a as kidnapping location since 2007. 
In that year, its percentage share in the abduction activities dropped to 88.0% in C1, 
respectively, 84.1% in C2. In 2008, Iraq lost its leading role for the first time since the 
beginning of the kidnapping wave. In C1, its share in total kidnappings lowered to 50.0%, in 
C2 even to 16.7%. Figure 2 makes clear, that the drop of the ‘kidnapping industry’ in Iraq, 
once “a signature of post-war Iraqi terrorism” [13] was the decisive factor for the general 
decline of acts of hostage taking in 2008. The main reason for this development can be found 
in the improvement of the security situation in Mesopotamia (particularly the weakening of 
radical Islamist groups like Ansar al-Islam and Al-Qaeda in Iraq. These two groups were – as 
we will see below – most often responsible for this type of crime).
Fate and Gender of Hostages
Most media-oriented kidnappings ended with the death of at least one hostage. In 93 (86.9%) 
out of 107 kidnappings in C2, one or several abductees lost their lives. In only nine acts of  
hostage taking (8.41%), all captured victims regained their freedom; in the remaining five 
(4.7%) cases, the fate of at least one captive was left unknown. 273 (73.2%) of the 373 
hostages were killed, 79 (21.2%) were freed while the fate of 21 others (5.6%) remains 
unknown. The low number of unknown outcomes indicates that abductors seem to think that 
it is more useful to inform the world about the ending of a kidnapping operation than to 
generate psychological pressure by creating suspense. The main cause of death for hostages 
was execution at the hands of  their kidnappers. All 273 fatalities in C2 [14] were caused by 
execution. Abductions with fatalities (C1), were – evidently – characterized by an even 
higher percentage of killed victims: 456 (83.7%) abductees lost their lives, 70 (12.8%) were 
freed, the fate of 19 (3.5%) remained unknown. Shooting was the most prevalent execution 
method: 267 (59.2%) of the 451 executed hostages (C1) were shot by their captors, 72 
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attention), three of the victims (0.7%) were doused with kerosene and burned alive.
If one analyzes the gender of abductees, one can see that men were much more often 
kidnapped than women. Less than 8 percent of the abduction victims (C1: 5.1%, C2: 7.8%) 
were female, whereas the bulk of abductees was male (C1: 94.9%, C2: 92.2%). On top of 
that, the death rate of male hostages was much higher than that of female victims. More than 
three-fourths of the kidnapped men (C1: 86.3%, C2: 77.6%) lost their lives. In contrast, 
“only” 35.7% of the women recorded in C1 and 20.7% in C2 were killed. This noticeable 
difference can be most likely attributed to moral, cultural and religious restraints. The 
abduction and killing of women is considered un-Islamic in the Muslim world and has thus 
been proven counterproductive for a successful media campaign by insurgents. During a 
mass kidnapping of 23 South Koreans in 2007, the Afghan Taliban were heavily criticized 
because 16 of their victims were female. According to media reports, the Taliban leadership 
was “unhappy at the kidnapping of women by their fighters”. [15]
Nationality of  Victims
If we combine both data sets, state residents from not fewer than 31 nations became victims 
of abductions. Western mainstream media reports have suggested that inhabitants of countries 
that provided troops for the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were mainly affected 
by kidnappings. However, an examination of media-oriented hostage takings offers a 
different picture:
•	
 First, citizens from the three countries in armed conflict  - Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan - were the main targets of abductors. More than three-fourths (C1: 72.1%, 
C2: 76.4%) of the victims came from these three conflict-ridden countries. 
•	
 Second, citizens from countries who had no military presence in Iraq were often 
targeted. Nepalese, for example, became the fourth frequent target of kidnappers in 
C1.
•	
 Third, residents from countries who provided a high amount of troops for the military 
engagement in Iraq and/or Afghanistan (for example, the Netherlands or Georgia) 
were not targeted at all.
What speaks against the hypothesis that there is a heightened victimization of coalition 
nationals is the fact that the death rate of captives from coalition countries is markedly lower 
than that of hostages from non-coalition nations. While 56.0% (C1), respectively, 27.8% (C2) 
of the abductees whose origin was a coalition country lost their lives, a much higher number 
of hostages from non-coalition nations was killed (C1: 97.7%, C2: 69.2%). 
If we categorize hostages as foreigners and non-foreigners and examine the victimization 
patterns year-by-year, one notes that the targeting patterns have shifted to locals since 2005. 
In the figure below, a ‘foreign’ refers to a person kidnapped in a nation other than his or her 
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equal (foreigners: 51.0%, non-foreigners: 49.0%), since 2005, the amount of local hostages 
has increased (C1). Figure 3 shows that the imbalance between foreigners and non-foreigners 
was especially great in 2007 and 2008: In 2007, the number of local residents was 5.6 (C1), 
respectively, 4.7 (C2) times higher than that of the non-domestic captives, in 2008, it was 
even 16.5 (C1), respectively, 6.3 (C2) times higher. 
Figure 3: Year-by-Year Ratio of Foreign and Non-Foreign Abductees 2004-2008 (C1)
The increasing amount of domestic abduction victims signalizes a change of strategy by 
insurgents/terrorists - their targeting patterns have shifted from the ‘far enemy’ to the ‘near 
enemy’. The strengthening  of the security services in  Iraq and Afghanistan as well as 
Pakistan's supporting role in the war on terrorism have created a situation where “hunting 
down armed 'collaborators' has become one of the armed oppositions' primary 
concerns“ [16]. The militants' harsh crack-down against local residents is also mirrored by the 
death rate of their victims: While 68.0% of the foreigners in C1 and 38.1% in C2 were killed, 
a significantly higher amount of locals lost their lives (C1: 89.6%, C2: 83.7%). The high 
death rate of domestic kidnap victims indicates that such kidnappings of non-foreigners 
primary serve the purpose of psychological warfare - local inhabitants of conflict zones are 
dissuaded from supporting the ‘apostates’ and ‘crusaders’.
Profession of Hostages
Around half of the abductees worked in the security sector (C1: 47.5%, C2: 50.9%). Here, 
persons with a military or paramilitary background were most often targeted (C1: 25.1%, C2: 
28.7%). Civilians who worked for the government were the second most victimized 
professional category (C1: 17.4%, C2: 19.3%). The bulk of them (roughly 95% in both data 
sets) performed security tasks (police, building protection etc.). Private security contractors 
were the fourth (C1: 5.7%), respectively, fifth most (4.0%) targeted occupational group. 
There are two obvious reasons for the above-average victimization of security professionals: 
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 First, security forces are fighting directly against the insurgents and are therefore 
considered enemies by them. 
•	
 Second, most of the abduction victims who worked in the security sector were 
assigned to tasks that – on a more or less regular basis – required direct enemy contact   
that exposed them to a higher abduction risk. 
The higher percentage of security professionals in C2 is a further sign for a strategy changing 
towards the ‘near enemy’ as most of the victims from this occupational group were non-
foreigners. Not only the targeting patterns but also the death rate of abductees  reflect the fact 
that members of  security organizations and government employees are treated by the 
insurgents as enemies. More than four-fifths (C1: 87.6%, C2: 83.1%) of the hostages linked 
to a military or paramilitary entity, lost their lives. Yet the death rate of government 
employees was even higher. All abductees in C1 and 98.6% in C2 were killed during their 
captivity. On the other hand, the death rate of professionals belonging to the private security 
sector firms was markedly lower (C1: 74.2%, C2: 73.3%). Among other factors, this might 
have been caused by the fact that many of them were foreigners – a status which made them 
more interesting for financially motivated kidnappers.
In an earlier study on kidnappings in Iraq (covering the period April to August 2004), Thomas 
Hegghammer had noticed a “clear dominance of drivers and manual workers”  [17] among 
the victims. This study reaches similar findings: In C1, drivers were the third, workers the 
fourth most often targeted professional group. However, in C2, their significance decreased 
(drivers: from 8.4% in C1 to 3.2% in C2; workers: from 6.8% in C1 to 1.61% in C2). These 
findings which can also be observed in regards to other professional groups were probably 
not only caused by the different approaches of both data sets, but might also be a further 
indicator for a heightened victimization of the ‘near enemy’: While Iraqi abductors in 2004 
eagerly tried to deter foreign nations from providing helpers for the reconstruction, since 
2005, their interests have shifted to the ‘near enemy’, especially the domestic security forces. 
Organizational Membership of Abductors
As most kidnapping incidents in our four countries study took place in Iraq, it is not 
surprising that the bulk of hostage takings in both samples (C1: 94.0%, C2: 85.0%) was 
conducted by militant organizations active there. Insurgent groups claiming abductions can 
be dichotomously categorized in regularly and singularly active organizations. The first 
category consists of established militant groups which regularly claim attacks over a longer 
period of time. Their modus operandi is not restricted to hostage takings but rather 
encompasses a much broader spectrum of different terrorist and/or guerrilla tactics. The 
second category comprises organizations who surface only once or a few times. Usually, they 
claim just a single operation – mostly a kidnapping – and are not heard of again. Only in 
exceptional cases, they conduct one or two more abductions. Experts suppose that many of 
those mayflies, in fact, are brigades of established organizations who do not want to use their 
PERSPECTIVES	 ﾠON	 ﾠTERRORISM	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Volume	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠIssue	 ﾠ5
11	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ November	 ﾠ2010‘company name’ for strategic reasons. Most radical Islamist groups, for example, avoid 
openly demanding ransom money because asking for material goods is deemed un-Islamic in 
their salafist interpretation of Islam. In C1, 14 militant organizations who claimed 
kidnappings belonged to the first category, 16 to the latter. In C2, 12 insurgent groups could 
be assigned to the first category, 11 to the second. All organizations belonging to the category 
of singularly active organizations were based in Iraq.
Both data sets contained abductions in which the captors did not reveal any organizational 
affiliation. The low frequency of such cases (C1: 1.6%, C2: 3.7%) indicates that hostage 
takers are anxious to operate under a group name (even if it is not a common one like in the 
case of singularly active organizations). This conduct is probably part of the perpetrators' 
media strategy: As terrorism is a communication strategy, a terrorist attack is generally only 
successful if it becomes known who has conducted it (except in certain ‘false flag’ 
operations). Besides, the perpetrators' identification heightens the possibility that a terrorist 
attack is newsworthy because the mainstream media are more willing to report on an act of 
terrorism if the militants' affiliation is known. [18] In the category of the regularly active 
groups, the bulk of abductions (C1: 79.8%, C2: 70.0%) was claimed by only four militant 
organizations – all based in Iraq: Ansar al-Islam (AAI), Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Jaish Abu 
Bakr al-Siddiq al-Salafi (JAB) and Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI). The fact, that the three first 
mentioned groups are radical Islamist organizations, implicates that media-oriented 
kidnappings are the strategy of choice for groups with a radical Islamist ideology. The 
national Islamist IAI, had once been the organization of the national Islamist camp whose 
ideology was similar to AQI's. In recent years, growing rifts between radical and national 
Islamist organizations have led to a situation where formerly co-operating groups have grown 
apart in terms of ideology. This development was also mirrored in their kidnapping activities: 
While the IAI claimed a total of 6 kidnappings with fatalities in the years 2004 and 2005, it 
assumed responsibility for only one abduction per year in 2006 and 2007. It did not claim a 
single kidnapping in 2008.
Among the four Iraqi groups primary responsible for kidnapping activities, AAI and AQI 
dominated. Together they claimed 71.6% of the abductions in C1 and 64.5% of those in C2. 
Albeit AQI got the biggest media attention, it was in fact AAI that was responsible for most 
of the media-oriented abductions (C1: AAI: 43.7% vs. AQI: 27.9%; C2: AAI: 41.1% vs AQI: 
23.4%). A comparison between C1 and C2 reveals a rise of kidnappings by the Afghan and 
Pakistani Taliban (C1: 5.5% vs. C2: 12.2%). The increased percentage cannot be explained 
by the differences between C1 and C2 alone, but can certainly also be attributed to the 
strengthening of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban which triggered a growing number of 
abductions in both countries. All the other regularly active groups had only a marginal share 
in kidnapping activities (C1: 3.8%, C2: 3.7%). The singularly active groups also played only 
a secondary role. Roughly one-tenth of the recorded kidnappings (C1: 9.3%, C2: 10.3%) 
were claimed by them.
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but also the outcome of abductions (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: Outcome of Hostage Takings by Organizational Categories 2006-2008 (C2)
For example, nearly all kidnappings (C1: 93.8%, C2: 93.3%), which were conducted by AAI, 
AQI, JAB and IAI ended with the death of all abductees. If we relate the death rate to the 
high activity level of these groups, it becomes evident why abductions in Iraq are 
characterized by a very high ratio of fatalities. People who fell in the hands of the Taliban had 
a markedly higher chance of survival than captives of AAI, AQI, JAB and IAI: 50.0% of the 
Taliban kidnappings in C1 and 30.8% in C2 ended with the death of all abductees. The 
differing fatalities ratio of both organizational categories is probably rooted in the different 
demand strategies of the two groups: While AAI, AQI and IAI made disproportionate 
demands (like a complete withdrawal of troops from the country), the Taliban bargained for 
more ‘reasonable’ concessions (like a prisoner exchange). For Iraqi radical Islamists, making 
demands was often only a matter of form whereas their true motivation was exercising 
psychological pressure. JAB did not raise any demands at all – which implies that their 
hostage takings were exclusively driven by psychological warfare considerations. On the 
other hand, the Taliban did not only try to influence their target audience psychologically, but 
also aimed at extorting concrete concessions (especially when kidnappings involved 
foreigners).
If one analyzes the influence of the organizational membership, two more aspects are 
striking:
•	
 The method of killing: For example, AAI, AQI, JAB, IAI and the Afghan and 
Pakistani Taliban claimed 91.7% of all hostage decapitations. AQI beheaded most 
captives (30.6%) closely followed by AAI (27.8%). It appears that decapitations are 
the strategy of choice for radical Islamist organizations while groups with a more 
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method.
•	
 The duration of kidnappings: For instance, Taliban kidnappings lasted markedly 
longer than abductions by AAI, AQI, JAB and IAI (C1: 35.7 days vs. 9.2 days, C2: 
39.1 days vs. 6.8 days). This is a further indicator that the Taliban are more anxious to 
extort reasonable concessions than their Iraqi brethren whose main motivation 
consists in psychological warfare and who are therefore less interested in time-
consuming negotiations.
Demands
With regards to demands, is has to be pointed out that their analysis was more problematic 
than that of most other data categories; more than three-fourths of the recorded demands  
could not be classified unambiguously. In 82.6% of the cases in C1, the captors did not 
publicly make any demands for the release of their victims. In C2, the perpetrators abstained 
in 75.7% from demanding any concessions. Theoretically, abductors can refrain from raising 
demands for two reasons (however, merely on the basis of open source information, it cannot 
be said which one is more true):
•	
 The captors are not interested in negotiations: This is the typical setting of 
psychological-warfare motivated hostage takings. Those are lacking the element of 
demands which is otherwise stereotypically associated with ‘classical’ hostage 
situations. Instead of extorting a concrete entity (for example, a government), the 
captors try to influence a collective (the public) – i.e. a larger, less-specified target 
group; they want to influence that group psychologically to achieve a certain result 
such as increase public pressure to withdraw from coalition warfare. In the absence of 
negotiations, the hostage does not function as a ‘bargaining chip’.
•	
 The demands are conveyed in secret: many countries officially adhere to a strict no-
ransom policy (i.e. they do not make any concessions to kidnappers). However, in 
spite of the official ‘no negotiations, no concessions’ declaratory policy, a number of  
hard-line governments have engaged in several unofficial deals. In order to avoid  
undermining the credibility of a country's official policy, such deals are usually made 
in secret and denied in public.  
If we analyze hostage takings with regards to the nature of demands, we notice a significant 
dominance of cases with solely political demands (C1: 90.3%, C2: 76.9%). Cases, during 
which the captors brought forward exclusively financial demands, were either absent (C1) or  
played a subordinate role (C2: 7.7%). Hostage takings with a combination of political and 
financial demands were rare too (C1: 9.7%, C2: 15.4%). These findings indicate that 
abductors apparently refrain from explicitly demanding money. However, it is safe to  assume 
that the actual percentage of financially motivated kidnappings is higher - the nature of public 
demands does not always reveal the kidnappers' true motivations. For example, hostage 
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motivated kidnappers accept a ransom payment if they realize that their extortion attempt will 
not lead to accepting their political demands.
Among the political demands, the most frequent single demand was a prisoner release (C1: 
38.1%, C2: 39.7%). The second most frequently made demand was for the withdrawal of 
troops from a town, a region, or a country (C1: 23.8%, C2, 15.9%). With regards to financial 
demands, kidnappers either requested a ransom (C1: 3.2%, C2: 9.5%) or asked for a 
compensation money for human and material losses caused by military operations (C1: 
1.6%). However, the latter demand was only raised once.
Hostage and Execution Videos
Hostage videos are the most prevalent type of publications in media-oriented hostage takings 
(C1: 78.8%, C2: 72.1%). Other types of exposure (i.e. images of the captives or their ID-
cards as well as audio statements) played only a secondary role (C1: 21.2%, C2: 28.0%). In 
130 (73.0%) of the 178 hostage takings recorded in C1, the captors broadcasted video 
footage. During those kidnappings, 187 hostage videos were released – an average of 1.5 
videos per abduction. In 71 (66.4%) of the 107 kidnappings recorded in C2, the captors 
published video footage. In those cases, 99 hostage videos were released – on average 1.4 
videos per kidnapping. The average run-time of the tapes was 6.3 minutes in C1, and 8.0 
minutes in C2, respectively. The longer average run-time in C2 was influenced by the fact, 
that since 2006, captors have released longer lasting compilation videos lasting between 24 
and 63 minutes. 
A sub-classification of the recorded hostage videos reveals that execution videos and 
‘classical’ hostage videos (i.e. tapes which show the captive alive serving as a proof-of-life or 
as a mouth piece for publicizing demands) were the most frequent type of hostage footage. 
52.4% of the videos recorded in C1 were execution videos, 36.4% were ‘classical’ hostage 
videos. Conversely, in C2, ‘classical’ hostage videos had the biggest share in video 
publications (51.5%), whereas execution videos here made up only the second-largest sub-
category (36.4%). While the differing methodical approaches (only kidnappings with 
fatalities vs. abductions with all types of outcome) certainly contributed to the quantitative 
differences between C1 and C2, those disparities can also be attributed to a general decline of 
execution videos due to changing ‘PR’ considerations of the kidnappers. Other types of 
hostage videos (for example, post-mortem tapes showing captives after execution) played 
only a marginal role. Together, they made up only around ten percent of all video publications 
(C1 and C2). The popularity of ‘classical’ hostage videos and execution footage can be 
attributed to several advantages perceived by the kidnappers:
•	
 Credibility: Hostage videos serve to provide a proof-of-life and evidence that a group 
is indeed responsible for a kidnapping and holding the victim in captivity. Execution 
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indeed killed by the captors.
•	
 Emotionalization: Hostage and execution videos enable the audience to get a picture 
of a captive's physical and psychological situation. As the footage documents the 
victim's fear and agony, it is also used to create compassion in one or more target 
groups, who can thereby be induced to apply political pressure (e.g. appeals to 
government) and thereby  influence the political process (reduce sympathy for an 
acting government, calls for a troop withdrawal from a conflict zone, etc.)
•	
 Newsworthiness: Hostage footage tends to get extraordinary media coverage. 
Kidnappings involve life-and-death situations where the outcome is in the balance and 
sectors of the public identify either with the victim or (more rarely) with the terrorist. 
The combination of “human interest”, conflict and drama often proves irresistible for 
media, especially commercial ones, wishing to attract and hold audiences.
•	
 Psychological warfare: Hostage videos demonstrate the power of the abductors to 
exert total control on their defenseless captives; by displaying the helplessness of the  
victim they enhance public fear of the perpetrators thus adding weight to their threats 
and demands. Execution videos are the embodiment of a ‘theater of terror’ and create 
maximum shock value. However, they also create feelings of revenge.
If we sub-categorize execution videos, we can see that videos involving killing by gunfire 
were the most frequent type of execution footage (54.8%). Beheading videos accounted for 
42.3%. Beheadings are more frequently media-transmitted than shootings: While only 16.0% 
of all hostage executions were beheadings, decapitation videos made up 42.3% of the 
recorded execution tapes. On the other hand, the percentage of shootings was higher than that 
of shooting videos (59.2% vs. 54.8%). Nevertheless, the controversial effect of execution 
footage (especially beheading scenes) has caused the insurgents to rethink the use of such 
cruel footage as an instrument in their war of ‘nerves’. The fear of losing part of their  
constituency is evident from internal and public directives by Jihadist ideologues (for 
example, Ayman al-Zawahiri). There have also been heated discussions in Jihadist forums on 
the Internet. As a result, there has been a sharp decrease of execution videos.
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 With regards to decapitation footage, changes in the public release patterns could already be 
observed in the period between summer 2004 and summer 2005. Figure 5 visualizes that 
during the first Iraqi kidnapping peak in autumn 2004, kidnappers mainly published 
beheading videos. However, in the course of the next abduction peak in early 2005, this 
distribution almost inverted: shooting videos became the most prevalent type of execution 
videos. 
Publication Channel for Hostage-related Media Products
If we have a look at the publication outlets kidnappers used for the distribution of their 
footage, a clear preference for the Internet can be seen. Around three-fourths of the recorded 
hostage media were distributed online (C1: 75.4%, C2: 73.5%), whereas only a quarter was 
disseminated via traditional media channels (for example, the Qatar broadcasting company 
Al-Jazeera). The reasons for the popularity of the Internet are obvious. They are rooted in 
several advantages for both militants and their sympathizers: first, and foremost, the versatile 
applications (propaganda, publicity, psychological warfare, fund-raising, recruitment, etc.) 
but also in more general advantages (amongst them: independence from time and location, 
multimedia environment, independence from editorial control or censorship by official 
media, possibility of quick and anonymous communication). Together, they make the Internet 
an ideal platform for terrorist threat- and violence-based communications. 
Figure 6 makes clear that the Internet did not gain its leading role right from the beginning of 
the Iraqi kidnapping campaign; it reached its full potential only with some delay. However,  
after a long-term preference for the use of  the Internet we see that traditional media re-gained 
some of their initial significance in 2008. This might have to do with the kidnappers' 
organizational affiliation. The highly active Iraqi radical Islamist groups (AAI, AQI, JAB and 
IAI) made strongest use of the Internet. 89.5% of their media-oriented publications recorded 
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exclusion of other channels. In contrast, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban passed the bulk of 
their media footage to traditional media outlets (for example, the Pakistani news station GEO 
TV). This can be partly attributed to the fact that the Taliban's media skills ARE still behind 
those of Iraqi insurgent groups – even though it has made considerable progress in recent 
years due to the influence of their more Internet-savvy sister organizations (especially Al-
Qaeda Central and AQI). 
Figure 6: Publication Channel for Hostage Media: Year-by-Year Comparison 2004-2008 
(C1)
A year-by-year comparison of online and traditional publications reveals three characteristic 
patterns, apparently determined by organizational specifics:
•	
 2004: Gradual unfolding of the AAI/AQI/IAI [19] media campaign / maneuvering 
between online and traditional publications: The three most Internet-savvy Iraqi 
insurgent groups, responsible for the bulk of media-oriented hostage takings, did not 
started their media campaigns at the same time. Only by August 2004, all three 
organizations regularly published hostage media. Besides, in their ‘experimental 
phase', AAI, AQI and IAI disseminated their materials through different channels 
(probably to examine the media effect). Execution videos were mainly distributed 
online, while ‘classical’ hostage tapes were often passed on to traditional media 
outlets. For example, 83.3% of AQI's execution videos were posted to the Internet, 
while only 30.0% of their non-bloody footage was released online. In doing so, the 
kidnappers apparently tried to circumvent any censorship of their cruel footage by the 
mainstream media.
•	
 2005/2006: Commitment to the Internet / predominance of online publications: Since 
February 2005, AAI, AQI, IAI (and since then also JAB) relocated their media 
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rooted in the evolution of the insurgents' media campaign strategy. Apparently, the 
militants came to the conclusion that the Internet is a better instrument for the 
distribution of terrorist materials than the traditional media.
•	
 2007/2008: Revival of traditional distribution channels: Increasing kidnapping 
activities by Afghan and Pakistani insurgents triggered a growing number of hostage 
media portrayals from the AfPak region. As the AfPak insurgents (especially the 
Taliban) are less Internet-savvy than their Iraqi counterparts, the traditional media 
gained back prominence at the expense of the Internet.
The findings indicate that generalizations about  Internet usage by terrorists are tricky as 
practices are decisively influenced by group-specific features.
Conclusion
By utilizing quantitative methods that allow the identification of concrete numbers and the 
calculation of percentage shares of media-oriented acts of hostage taking – a terrorist strategy 
that, with a few exceptions, had only be discussed on the basis of intuitive estimates until 
now – this study has (at least partially) closed an existing research gap. On the one hand, the 
analysis provided information about quantitative aspects of the kidnapping activities. For 
example, the total amount of media-oriented hostage takings (C1: 178, C2: 107), abducted 
persons (C1: 545, C2: 373), and published hostage videos (C1: 187, C2: 99) could be 
determined. The long-term tracking of Islamist online presences did not only allow the 
identification of static values (i.e. total values), it also made possible an analysis of 
developments over time. For example, it could be shown that in 2008, the number of media-
oriented hostage takings has markedly decreased (drop to 0,2 (C1), respectively, 0,5 (C2) 
kidnappings per month – while the total monthly average was 2.97 kidnappings). 
On the other hand, the study offered qualitative insights into the strategy of media-oriented 
hostage takings. So it became clear that Iraq was the main conflict theatre for abductions 
(more than 85.0% of the kidnappings recorded in both datasets happened in Mesopotamia), 
and that Afghanistan and Pakistan have begun to play a growing – though not yet comparable 
– role. The kidnappers' organizational membership turned out to be the core parameter in the 
analysis. It decisively affects other factors such as the amount of kidnappings, the likelihood 
of fatalities, the duration of hostage crises, or the choice of publication channels for hostage-
related media footage. When assessing and responding to hostage situations, counter-terrorist  
policy-makers should therefore give top priority to organizational factors of terrorist groups.
A holistic assessment of the findings of the study makes it necessary to take into account the 
restrictions of the methodology utilized in this study. First, I have to stress the incompleteness 
of body of data in database  C1. The restriction to hostage takings deemed newsworthy by 
official and public media (i.e. those with fatalities) stood in the way of an integral view of the 
phenomenon. A second restriction, which also relates to C2, is the limitation on media-
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PR-oriented propaganda campaign and their actual needs on the physical battlefield, only an 
additional analysis of non-media-oriented kidnappings – and a comparison between media-
oriented and non-media-oriented hostage takings – could guarantee a holistic examination of 
the activities. In Iraq and Afghanistan, a kidnapping-industry has emerged in recent years; 
likewise in Pakistan, we can observe an increase in hostage takings. Most of these abductions 
occur in the shadow zone beyond the scope of the news value system that determines 
coverage by the mainstream media. A comparison of media-oriented (psychological warfare, 
political motivation) and non-media-oriented (mainly criminal) abductions would show us in 
all probability a much larger proportion of financially motivated abductions. This hypothesis 
is supported by reports on child abductions in Iraq: while in none of the media-oriented 
kidnappings children were targeted, time and again one can find reports on non-media-
oriented, financially motivated abductions, in which Iraqi children were targeted. [20]
A third shortcoming of this study is its limitation to Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia. To get a fuller picture of media-oriented hostage takings, one should expand the 
analysis to other regions and also explore supra-regional developments. In addition, a 
comparison  between hostage takings where the location of the victim is not known, and 
hostage situations where the hostages are holed up in a known location with the hostage 
takers might also be warranted. Last but not least, the role and quality of official and public 
media-coverage and the Internet in the contagion of  kidnappings and hostage takings ought 
to be explored. 
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Abstract
 Zachary Chesser (alias Abu Talhah al-Amrikee), a prolific 20-year-old online jihadist pundit, 
was arrested on 21 July 2010 for allegedly attempting to join the Somali jihadist group Al-
Shabab. Before his arrest, Chesser produced numerous analytical and strategic writings aimed 
at ensuring that the transnational jihadist movement represented by Al-Qaeda’s Senior 
Leadership (AQSL) continues to exist beyond the present generation. In his last major essay, 
Chesser attempted to develop and propose a grassroot-based, inclusive approach toward jihadist 
recruitment, drawing upon the writings of prominent jihadists such as Yusuf al-Uyairi. It remains 
unclear as to whether Chesser is representative of a new breed of American jihadist pundit-
operatives.
Zachary Chesser, the 20-year-old Virginia man best known for issuing thinly-veiled threats to the 
creators of the Comedy Central TV show South Park earlier this year, was a prolific writer and 
self-styled grassroots jihadist strategist. He was a regular poster on several major jihadist Internet 
forums, including Al-Qimmah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Summit), a Somali-English-Arabic forum 
dedicated to covering the activities of the Somali jihadist group Al-Shabab. It is this group that 
Chesser was accused by US authorities of attempting to join. He signed his online writings with 
his nom de guerre Abu Talhah al-Amrikee, which combines the name of a prominent historical 
companion of the Prophet Muhammad with the geographical marker “American.”[1] An 
advocate of a grassroots approach to recruitment and propaganda, Chesser was remarkably 
willing to engage with intellectual opponents (such as Al-Qaeda specialist Jarret Brachman) in 
debates on a variety of issues concerning the present state of the transnational jihadist movement 
represented by Al-Qaeda’s Senior Leadership (AQSL) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and its 
regional affiliates and allies.[2] He was also a voracious reader of counter-terrorism websites and 
writings by various academic specialists and analysts.
It is clear from Chesser’s work that he considers himself a militant intellectual, a grassroots 
missionary dedicated to propagating the transnational jihadist cause as he interprets it. In his last 
major strategic essay – a 25-page piece entitled Raising Al-Qaeda: A Look into the Long Term 
Obligations of the Global Jihad Movement – Chesser sought to formulate a long-term plan to 
ensure that the transnational jihadist ideology he supported survives and is even strengthened in 
future generations. In the essay, published on jihadist and file-sharing websites during the first 
week of  July this year, Chesser combined past writings by other, more influential jihadist 
intellectuals with his own original analyses, before making “recommendations” for transnational 
jihadists to consider.  
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albeit failed – attempts to link up with Al-Shabab, it is well worth considering Raising Al-Qaeda 
in more detail. In addition, his responses in his last (written) interview before his arrest in late 
July by the FBI and an online conversation with this author shed additional light onto Chesser, 
one of the most prevalent cyber jihadist writers in English in recent memory.
Legitimacy and Necessity
Chesser begins the essay by writing that the “allure” of jihadist militancy has reached a height 
greater than any seen before in the “last one hundred years”. This “allure”, he writes, “has 
become so enamouring that even disbelieving parents of disbelieving children are worried about 
their offspring going off to die for the sake of God”. Despite this positive development,  Chesser 
argues that a long-term strategy that will ensure the “longevity” of the transnational jihadist 
movement is still needed.  One of the key ways to ensure that AQSL’s ideology will last, is to 
“normalise” in the mind of Muslims the legitimacy and necessity of fighting non-Muslims and 
their Muslim (apostate) allies.  These groups are enemies of Muslims, he says, and are actively 
engaged in the oppression and the  killing of Muslims around the world.  Why then,  Chesser 
asks, should Muslims feel hesitant or guilty about fighting them?
Significantly, Chesser does not limit the scope of his argument to the minority of Muslims who 
support Al-Qaeda senior leadership and like-minded groups.  Rather, he seeks to develop an 
inclusive strategy that will encompass all Muslims, a goal that he develops further in later 
sections of the essay. Referencing the concept of “true” Muslims as “strangers” (Al-Ghuraba’) 
found in hadith literature and classical and medieval Muslim religious writings [3], Chesser 
writes: “The Prophet (Muhammad) told us that al-Ghuraba’ are a blessed people, but the 
implications of this hadith was not for us to instil strangeness in the regular acts of worship. 
Rather, we should seek to create an entire national of Ghuraba… We must seek to remove the 
status of the Ghuraba’ being a group among the Muslims, and shift it to being a group known as 
the ‘Muslims’ among the entire of humanity.”  In short, Chesser seeks to move the vast majority 
of the world’s Muslims from opposition or neutrality toward the transnational jihadist movement 
to active support.
He argues that a “plurality” of Muslims is “moustache only”. They have “abandoned jihad 
(struggle) in God’s cause” and are Muslim in name only. Chesser is divided over whether or not 
to target this group of Muslims for recruitment. On the one hand, he writes that “it is not 
particularly beneficial to target them in trying to recruit mujahideen”. Yet he continues: 
“However, this group has a plurality among men in this Ummah (worldwide Muslim 
community), so it cannot be outright ignored.” Chesser ultimately hopes to woo this group of 
Muslims into becoming “mildly supportive” or at least “indifferent” to the transnational jihadist 
movement. In other words, he seeks to move them away from their current opposition to the 
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energetic supporters.
One of the best ways to win over this group, Chesser suggests, is to convince them of the worldly 
benefits that they will enjoy from their support of groups such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab. The 
reason for this is that “moustache only” Muslims are concerned with this world rather than the 
afterlife. Thus, they are more likely to be won over by promises of worldly material gain. He 
identifies Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as a prime example of a transnational 
jihadist group that has put this strategy into practice, pointing out their relations with Yemen’s 
discontented tribes. Targeting marginal Muslims is vital in order to smooth the path for the 
younger generation to actively participate in AQSL’s campaign. This is the case, Chesser argues, 
because “the most important group to target is the group which is most beneficial to the jihad, 
and that is young men.  However, it is much easier for one to come to terms with leaving for 
jihad when one’s parents are supportive, or at least not reprehensive regarding the matter”.
Revitalisation
The second section of Chesser’s essay is dedicated to a discussion of how to revitalise jihadist 
missionary activity, with a particular emphasis on Muslim women.  Referring to them as “the 
forgotten fifty percent”, he writes: “It is very sad to see the lack of material which is directly 
targeting the sisters of our Ummah from the mujahidin [sic] and their supporters [because]… the 
encouraging words of a mother, a sister, or a wife are far more powerful than the encouragement 
one receives from their brothers.” Citing famous historical supporters of jihad, such as the pre-
Islamic and early Islamic period elegiac poetess al-Khansa’, Chesser urges jihadists to “seriously 
target our sisters in the da‘wa (missionary work)”.
One of the best ways to increase the number of Muslim women who support the transnational 
jihadist movement is to ensure that their contributions are recognised publicly. Chesser argues: 
“A lot of sisters [Muslim women] are very involved in the support of the mujahideen, but their 
efforts go unmentioned, so other sisters do not have anything to look forward to from what they 
know.” Chesser’s argument that “pious”, as he defines it, Muslim women are the primary raisers 
of future jihadists is not particularly revolutionary in the wider field of transnational jihadist 
literature. In fact, his arguments are largely rehashed from views expressed by exponentially 
more influential jihadist figures including the late founder of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, Yusuf al-
Uyairi. Al-Uyairi, who was killed in 2003 by Saudi security forces, wrote an influential treatise 
in 2000 on the topic of women in jihad entitled Women’s Role in Fighting the Enemies. Similar 
views about female participation in AQSL’s jihad were also expressed in a December 2009 letter 
addressed “to the Muslim sisters”, authored by ‘Umaymah al-Zawahiri, the wife of Al-Qaeda 
deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. [4]
Raising Al-Qaeda
PERSPECTIVES	 ﾠON	 ﾠTERRORISM	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Volume	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠIssue	 ﾠ5
24	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ November	 ﾠ2010The core of Chesser’s essay is dedicated to explaining his strategy on how best to 
“Raise Al-Qaeda”; that is, how to rear future generations of jihadists. At the core of his strategy 
is instilling a “love” of jihad among Muslim youth and removing their doubts and fears of it. 
Muslim youth, he argues, must be raised with a clear understanding of the requirement of jihad 
and should have a sincere and overwhelming desire to participate in it. They must be made to 
understand that it is through jihad that oppressed Muslims around the world are best defended 
from “Crusaders, Zionists, and apostate Muslims”.  
Interestingly, Chesser sees the United States as a model to emulate with regard to how best to run 
a domestic propaganda campaign. He writes that this is because the US has historically been 
adept at instilling a sense of blind patriotism in the majority of its citizens, thus ensuring that any 
form of dissent from the government’s line is seen as a kind of “treason”. He contradicts himself 
on this point, however. While he is highly critical of this type of indoctrination, at the same time 
he argues that it is a practice worthy of emulation by jihadists because it will enable them to train 
a new generation of Al-Qaeda foot soldiers. He writes: “While we might currently be at war with 
America, this does not stop us from looking into the success they had in building their ideology 
and learning from it. America has built a culture which is blindly patriotic and rallies behind 
empty words and loaded terms with a ferocity that is unrivalled in the modern world.” Similarly, 
jihadists need to work hard to instil a sense of “patriotism” in their children. They can do this by 
creating an environment that embraces AQSL’s definition of jihad, though presumably (and 
Chesser is not clear on this point) jihadists would not duplicate the “empty” sloganeering that he 
accuses the US of having used throughout history.
One of the key obstacles to the normalisation of jihad in the minds of future generations of 
Muslims is its “over-analysis,” according to Chesser. What is needed, he argues, is a 
simplification of the topic so that those Muslims who “hide behind” technicalities and obscure 
academic debates will no longer be able to “confuse” Muslim youth about the religious 
obligation to participate in jihad.  He writes: “We need to raise our children with the 
understanding that there is a time for peace and a time for war. We need to raise them knowing 
that there is a time for mercy and a time to kill. They cannot have hesitation in either matter, and 
the matters are not complicated. Islam is very clear on the matter, so it should not be hard to 
make this a foundation of a child’s understanding.”  Chesser’s philistine pronouncements are 
disproven by the sheer volume of Muslim juridical writings on jihad and its many types.
In order to eradicate the problem of “over-analysing” jihad by future generations of Muslims, 
Chesser argues that Muslim youth need to be taught about the issues related to jihad from an 
early age, including the differences between defensive and offensive jihad, the appropriate 
distribution of war spoils, and the jurisprudence of jihad. In order to connect today’s  youth to 
their history, they should be educated about the illustrious military career of the Prophet 
Muhammad and his companions, the Sahaba, just as many children in the US are taught about 
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encouraged to emulate great historical Muslim military leaders and play martial games with toy 
weapons in order to “normalise” the notion of participating in military activities. Older children 
and young adults should be trained in the use of real weapons such as hunting rifles and bows. 
Games such as laser tag and paintball, he writes, will also be useful in beginning to train Muslim 
youth to be warriors.
Reforming jihadist media
Jihadist media and education,  Chesser argues, should not simply be a top-down process.  Rather, 
it should be transformed into a grassroots, bottom-up movement. The fruits of this approach will 
be an increase in domestic jihadist recruitment in the US, Canada and Europe.  He writes: “It is 
this shift which is occurring in the West and has led to the surge in ‘homegrown’ attacks on 
American soil.” In order to ensure that this shift continues, it is necessary to target all potential 
groups of recruits rather than being elitist with regard to media production and  targeting. 
Chesser notes: “One of the things the media outlets of the mujahidin [sic] really need to consider 
is the longevity of their methods… Our media has to demonstrate a platform and the benefits of 
victory and resistance.  Additionally, if we do not begin to target audiences outside of the ones 
currently targeted, then the current momentum will die with this generation.” Chesser recognises 
that “preaching to the choir” will not ensure the survival of the transnational jihadist movement 
beyond the current generation.
Chesser’s plan for reforming and retargeting jihadist media is built upon a broadly inclusive 
approach toward potential jihadist recruits. He singles out three specific groups of people who 
are not currently targeted but should be in order to broaden the pool of potential recruits. The 
first of these groups is the “IQ Sub-100” or those who have “a degree of difficulty in 
understanding elaborate sentence structures and complicated political concepts”. This group, 
Chesser argues, often sees overly-complicated arguments as disingenuous trickery so it is best to 
keep the message of jihadist media targeting them simple and direct. A simplified approach will 
be more successful in convincing the “IQ Sub-100” group to support and participate in Al-
Qaeda-style jihad.
The second group is “sinful Muslims”. Although they may not at first seem to be the ideal pool 
of recruits, this was the group that, according to Chesser, “virtually every single emigrant 
[jihadist] from the West was [a member of] at one time”.  Because every single Western jihadist 
was at one time either a “fasiq [violator of Islamic law] or a kafir [unbeliever],” Chesser writes, 
adding,  “we cannot think highly of ourselves”.
The third group is composed of those Muslims who blindly follow the schools of Muslim 
jurisprudential thought with regard to the application of Islamic law.
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The driving goal of Chesser’s strategy, as expressed in Raising Al-Qaeda, is the construction of 
as inclusive a jihadist movement as possible. Exactly how inclusive a movement can truly be is 
open to debate. He points to the Yemen-based  AQAP-affiliated preacher Anwar al-Awlaqi as one 
of the most successful examples of a jihadist scholar who has actively reached out to “sinful” 
Muslims. By winning over these lapsed Muslims, he argues, “we will be doing a great thing 
toward the spiritual revitalisation of this Ummah.”  The third group, which he calls “madhhabist” 
Muslims or those who blindly follow a legal school of thought, can, in his view, be won over if 
jihadists ground their recruitment campaigns in the juridical traditions and schools of thought 
(madhhab) that members of this group adhere to.
In the essay’s conclusion, Chesser argues that it is vital for jihadists to be specific in their 
discussions about what the creation of an Al-Qaeda-style Islamic state will mean for the world’s 
Muslims. He writes: “The credibility of the mujahideen currently rests on their jihad and on their 
uncompromising nature when it comes to the truth… However, it is necessary to expand the 
areas in which the mujahideen have credibility with their audiences.… There is no harm in 
letting the movement develop unofficial policies on economics, education, leadership, power 
structure, transportation, science, technology, taxes, health, and other key areas that the Islamic 
state will have to address.  Such works will encourage the movers and shakers of society to re-
evaluate the jihad and the mujahideen. Additionally, it will provide the intellectual resources 
required for combating systems of unbelief and oppression.”  Chesser seeks to avoid the pitfalls 
and mistakes committed by “some” jihadist groups that he references but not by name. These 
groups are likely to include the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), of which Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is 
the largest member group, and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), whose violent 
insurgent campaigns have backfired on their efforts to win mass support.[5]
An uncertain vision?
When questioned about his vision of an Islamic state in his last interview before his arrest by the 
FBI in late July, Chesser was non-specific as to the precise characteristics of such a state.  He 
stated: “I hope to take part in the creation of an Islamic state where the Sharia [Islamic law] is 
applied with no exceptions of general matters of which there is a consensus… That is a bare 
minimum. After that I would hope that it [the Islamic state] is a just society where the law is 
applied and where the people are treated fairly. The leader [of the state] should not place himself 
above his subjects, and he should not abuse their property.”[6] The steps to achieving such a state 
and ensuring that it is “just” are not discussed by Chesser.
Chesser was also less than forthcoming about a claim he made in his online conversation with 
this author when he was questioned about the lack of a large number of actual religious jurists 
and scholars among transnational jihadists. Chesser claimed that jihadist intellectuals such as 
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religious scholars. Asked to name who these scholars were by this author, he dodged the question 
and simply responded with a general definition of an ijaza. [7]
When asked by this author what he hoped to achieve through his frequent online writings, 
Chesser responded: “I hope to help the Muslims in one way or another… Sometimes my target 
audience is the Muslims, sometimes it is the non-Muslims, and sometimes it is both. My 
objective depends on the audience. Sometimes I might try to dispel some misconception about 
Islam. I might try to provide a better picture of the situation on the ground in a particular region. 
Occasionally I write something completely with the I was somewhat successful in building 
audiences and influencing them for a while, so I mostly share my experience and my thoughts 
regarding that.” He continues that his efforts had shown some positive results: “I might be 
mistaken, but my impression is that I was at one point operating the #1 jihadist YouTube [sic] 
channel in terms of daily views, as well as RM [Revolution Muslim website] and my blog, which 
were both fairly successful.”[8]
When asked in the interview why, if he viewed Al-Qaeda’s military jihad as an individual 
religious requirement (fard‘ayn), he had not taken up arms himself, Chesser was defensive: 
“Simply leaving this country has been difficult enough for me so far.”[9] This claim was born out 
after his arrest when it was reported that he had tried and failed to travel to Somalia twice. [10] 
Earlier, in his online conversation with this author, Chesser wrote: “I have not decided not to 
make hijrah [to emigrate]. When I am able to make it, then I will, but until then I am stuck here 
[in the US].” Perhaps referencing the restrictions he faced as a result of inclusion on the US no-
fly list, Chesser noted: “I have had quite a bit of difficulty with various legal documents needed 
for travel.” However, he affirmed his dedication to ultimately leaving the US to take up arms: 
“The obligation of [emigration for jihad] was about 99 percent of my decision to drop out of 
GMU [George Mason University].”[11]
Although this author noted and asked Chesser about his use of Somali transliterations of Arabic 
words and names, the significance of this did not become fully clear until his July arrest. News 
of his arrest also put into perspective his praise and unabashed admiration for US national Omar 
Hammami (alias Abu Mansur Al-Amrikee) who has been portrayed by Al-Shabab as a field 
militia commander and military instructor in numerous Al-Shabab propaganda videos.[12] In his 
online conversation with this author, Chesser wrote: “If you want to see an American mujahid 
[warrior of faith] who is actually on track to becoming a sheikh [religious scholar], then keep 
your eyes on Abu Mansur… He memorised the Quran in just 8 months. Also, he REALLY 
[Emphasis in the original] memorised it. In Somalia, a hafiz of Quran [one who has memorised 
it] is someone who knows it without any mistakes.”
Conclusion
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guilty to charges of threatening writers of the television show South Park, soliciting violence, 
and attempting to provide material support to Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen in Somalia.  He 
faces a maximum prison sentence of 30 years and is scheduled to be sentenced on February 25, 
2011.[13]
While difficult to accurately gauge, the influence of Chesser’s strategic and analytical writings 
should not be inflated, but they should also not be ignored.  His numerous writings are a window, 
and often a detailed one at that, into the radicalisation process.  Chesser’s trajectory from his 
days an online jihadist pundit to his attempt to join Al-Shabab is a telling instance of how such a 
process can move remarkably quickly from online activism to operational mobilisation. From his 
conversion to Islam in 2008, Chesser moved rapidly into the realm of cyber jihadist activism. As 
Jarret Brachman has noted, it remains an important open question as to whether Chesser will 
prove to be representative of a new generation of American jihadist pundit-operatives.[14]
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Abstract
This article focuses on current counterterrorism and counterinsurgency doctrines.  It argues that 
the more traditional frameworks for analyzing counterterrorism campaigns, which structure 
debates around a military  (or war) model or a criminal justice model, need to be updated in the 
light of the current state of terrorism.  As a potential new framework, the author restructures the 
debate around hard and soft power tactics. He also describes how the existing counterinsurgency 
literature primarily focuses on two frameworks: classical and modern (or global) 
counterinsurgency.  Using the war in Afghanistan as an example, he compares and contrasts the 
strengths, weaknesses, and potential offsetting effects of modern counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency strategies, arguing that in order for the United States to be successful in its 
battle against Al-Qaeda’s brand of international terrorism, it must take its struggle from the open 
battlefields of counterinsurgency into the shadowy world  of counterterrorism.
Introduction
Nine years after 9/11, the struggle against international terrorism is at a crossroads.  Policy 
debates on whether to adopt a counterterrorism or counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan 
continue to drive contemporary security discourse in the United States and NATO.[1]  However, 
these debates provide little strategic clarity on how to counter international terrorism.  While Al-
Qaeda’s strategy is adaptive, the war in Afghanistan has become much more complicated than 
one would surmise from America’s stated goal to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”[2]  
Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency debates on Afghanistan are somewhat shortsighted –  
focusing too much on the strengths and weaknesses of short and long-term commitments while 
avoiding critical discussions about what a sustainable counterterrorism strategy should consist of 
at the international level.  The line between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy has 
become increasingly blurred, yet they are two rather distinct doctrines.
The American-led invasion of Iraq not only diverted attention away from the perpetrators of the 
9/11 attacks, it also gave rise to a new wave of research and analysis on insurgency and 
counterinsurgency warfare.  While the Al-Qaeda terrorism threat was not entirely ignored, 
research on terrorism tended to aggregate America’s terrorism and insurgency threats and frame 
counterterrorism within the context of counterinsurgency warfare, leading to the misleading 
conclusion that both strategies where mutually reinforcing.  There were at least three perceptions 
of the problem at hand. The first focused on how Al-Qaeda was exploiting the largely nationalist 
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to play the role of strategic spoiler. The second 
focused on the resilient and adaptive nature of Al-Qaeda as a global organization and its ability 
to project its ideology worldwide in order to gain more recruits and encourage new attacks. The 
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terrorism. 
This gave rise to several theoretical approaches to counter the threat posed to the U.S. forces on 
the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan: including enhanced policing, better intelligence and 
information operations, increased international cooperation, counter-radicalization programs, and 
the need for good governance and economic development – all in an attempt to address the ill-
understood underlying causes of terrorism.  Such prescriptions tended to misunderstand the 
nature of the terrorism and overplay causal linkages.
In the following I shall try to address five questions:  What is counterterrorism?  How has 
counterterrorism evolved over the past four decades?  What is the nature of counterinsurgency?  
How are counterterrorism and counterinsurgency doctrines similar and how are they different?  
And, finally, to what extent has the increased focus on counterinsurgency warfare after 9/11 
affected how we view the current nature of counterterrorism?  
What is Counterterrorism?
Counterterrorism is a difficult concept to define, especially for western democracies.  Paul 
Wilkinson writes that: “There is no universally applicable counter-terrorism policy for 
democracies.  Every conflict involving terrorism has its own unique characteristics.”[3] Both 
Paul Wilkinson and Louise Richardson argue, and they are not alone, that Western democracies 
must make respect for civil liberties and the rule of law a staple in their counterterrorism 
strategies.[4]  While this advice to liberal democracies is admirable and complies with 
championed democratic principles, it does not amount to a counterterrorism strategy – these are 
simply highly valued principles meant to guide counterterrorism.  
Counterterrorism is defined in the U.S. Army Field Manual as “Operations that include the 
offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.”[5]. This 
definition is more concrete but has its strengths and weaknesses.  First, it correctly states that 
counterterrorism is an all-inclusive doctrine including prevention, deterrence, preemption, and 
responses, which would require bringing to bare all aspects of a nation’s power both 
domestically and internationally.  Second, this definition includes everything but essentially 
differentiates nothing, which is a problem.  If an effective counterterrorism doctrine means 
‘whatever we need, whenever we need it,’ then this could create problems with developing 
effective counter strategies, allocating resources, and determining accountability – it might make 
the concept of counterterrorism rather worthless.  There are, however, advantages to an all-
encompassing approach to counterterrorism.  It allows a government such as the United States to 
recognize the complexities of responding to terrorism; it also provides a rhetorical tool that 
reinforces the notion that there is no simple fix to America’s terrorism problem – but that does 
little to help our understanding of counterterrorism.
Counterterrorism operations are subject to change according to the nature of the terrorism threat.  
Indeed, international terrorism, particularly Al-Qaeda terrorism, is and remains persistent and 
adaptive.  While terrorism is a tactic that cannot be entirely eradicated, steps can be taken to 
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prescriptions for addressing threats emanating from   ‘corrigible’ groups like Hamas and 
Hezbollah will look entirely different according to the political context, the current threat 
environment, and, of course, the government conducting the counterterrorism operations.  For 
instance, American would probably shy away from conducting Predator and Reaper drone strikes 
in southern Lebanon; this might not be a productive strategy in the long-term if the objective is 
to encourage Hezbollah to renounce terrorism, disarm, and fully blend its political and military 
forces into the existing Lebanese system.  By the same token, while Israel may continue to carry 
out targeted assassination strikes against Hamas leaders, it would not be in the interest of 
American foreign policy or its counterterrorism policy to conduct U.S. strikes in Gaza and the 
West Bank.  Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, is considered an ‘incorrigible’ terrorist organization 
with ambitious socio-political objectives which no government could realistically accommodate 
when trying to negotiate a political settlement and bring about an end to Al-Qaeda’s terrorism.  
Therefore, America has chosen a clearly enemy-centric approach to combating Al-Qaeda in order 
to achieve its objectives, which, as President Obama has recently stated, is to disrupt, dismantle, 
and defeat Al-Qaeda.   
In order to effectively frame current American counterterrorism efforts, it is important to 
appreciate the difference between counterterrorism policy and counterterrorism operations, and 
to fully understand the competing objectives and mandates within the American government.  
The U.S. Department of State has had a long-term no concessions counterterrorism policy, which 
continues today.[6]  This position was defined early on during its struggle against international 
terrorism.  In 1973, Palestinian terrorists seized six diplomats (including the American 
ambassador to Sudan) in Khartoum and demanded the release of over 60 terrorists jailed in 
Israel, Jordan, West Germany, and the United States.  Richard Nixon’s response was direct: “As 
far as the United States as a government giving in to blackmail demands, we cannot do so and 
will not do so.”[7]  However, after 9/11, while America’s no concessions policy remains intact, 
counterterrorism operations carried out by the Department of Defense and CIA highlight that 
counterterrorism had evolved into a more lethal form of asymmetric warfare, which further 
blurred the line between policy and operations and reinforced the notion that counterterrorism 
has become an all-encompassing approach.  
American counterterrorism policy and operations worldwide have, at times, appeared to present 
contradictions.  But this is largely a problem of understanding the American bureaucracy and the 
competing efforts of the U.S. State Department, Department of Defense, and its intelligence 
agencies, rather than proving or disproving any contradictions in American counterterrorism 
policy.  For example, Mark Perry has recently argued that America must talk to terrorists or risk 
losing the so-called war on terrorism.  Perry argues that America violated its ‘no concessions’ 
counterterrorism policy in Iraq when it chose to negotiate a settlement with the loose network of 
Iraqi tribal militias in the al-Anbar province.  By this logic, he argues, the U.S. must engage with 
other terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah because they are completely rational 
organizations with realistic political and social goals.[8]  But within the fog of war in Iraq, it is 
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with an insurgent enemy in order to quell violence within the broader context of an ongoing war.  
On the other hand, future negotiations with Hamas or Hezbollah, if they were to ever take place, 
would be handled by the Department of State within a non-war context.  
Daniel Byman argues that despite America’s attempts to isolate and weaken Hamas, the group 
has emerged stronger than ever and that direct engagement is the only option for resolving the 
conflict.[9]  The same can be said for Hezbollah in Lebanon.  However, practically no 
responsible analyst has argued that direct engagement with Al-Qaeda is an option for ending Al-
Qaeda’s terrorism.  This highlights the fact that different counterterrorism strategies are needed 
for different terrorist organizations and that different departments within the same government 
have different approaches.  In short, America’s ability to successfully isolate and weaken terrorist 
organizations is subject to debates.
We also have to look how counterterrorism has evolved over the past four decades in order to 
fully appreciate the current state of affairs and the widening gap between policies and operations.
The Evolution of Counterterrorism
Counterterrorism has changed over the past four decades; unsurprisingly, this evolution has 
mirrored changes in the nature of terrorism.  The current wave of international terrorism began 
arguably on July 22, 1968, when three members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) hijacked a commercial passenger flight from Rome to Tel Aviv.[10]  This 
represented at least three novelties.  First, it was one of the first hijackings where the objective 
was primarily political, and the target was specifically chosen for its symbolism.  Instead of 
hijacking any airplane, three Palestinian terrorists took control of an El Al plane from Israel’s 
national airline.  Second, the hijacking was intended to influence a wider audience, rather than 
for personal criminal gain or for escape by simply redirecting a flight for transport.  Rather, the 
terrorists were intending to trade hostages for imprisoned Palestinian terrorists in Israel.  In 
addition, it was the first time a terrorist organization began operating regularly at the 
international level, leaving its home turf to attack citizens of a foreign country who, in many 
cases, had nothing to do with their struggle in order to promote their political cause before an 
international audience.[11]  This encouraged other non-Palestinian groups – such as the ethno-
nationalist/separatist ASALA (the Armenian Army for the Secret Liberation of Armenia), the 
JCAG (Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide), militant elements within the Free South 
Moluccan Youth organization, and left-wing groups such as the German Red Army Faction (a.k.a 
the Baader-Meinhof Group) – to “internationalize” their political struggles.  These groups, Bruce 
Hoffman observed, learned from the PFLP that they could promote their cause worldwide by 
simply taking a plane, its crew, and its passengers hostage.  “When we hijack a plane it has more 
effect than if we killed a hundred Israelis in battle,” said George Habbash, the founding leader of 
the PFLP in a 1970 interview.  “For decades world opinion has been neither for nor against the 
Palestinians.  It simply ignored us,” he said.  “At least the world is talking about us now.”[12]
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1967 Six-Day War, and subsequent Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, West Bank, and the 
Sinai Peninsula, was a devastating defeat for the Palestinians and the Arab countries bordering 
Israel.  This inspired groups like the PFLP to begin operating internationally to promote their 
cause because there was no chance that it could defeat Israel on the battlefield.  Second, Latin 
American guerrilla fighters, frustrated with their battlefield failures in the countryside, began an 
urban terrorism campaign, which involved at first mainly the kidnapping of foreign diplomats.  
The primary tactics used by all of these groups were hijackings, kidnappings, and embassy raids, 
and the intention was, in addition to obtaining publicity, gaining ransoms and having imprisoned 
comrades exchanged for hostages and/or a safe passage away from the crime scene.[13]  Such 
terrorist blackmail forced governments to respond accordingly. While acts of terrorism at this 
time killed relatively few people, such publicity stunts put tremendous pressure on governments 
to respond responsibly since a wrong decision during a hostage crisis could have disastrous 
consequences and the blame was likely to land in the court of the government.  An example of 
this was the German response to the attack on Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich 
on September 5, 1972: eleven Israeli athletes (and eight members of the Palestinian Black 
September) were killed after a hostage standoff that ended in a shootout.  While the West 
German government was not the primary target of the attack, the scene of crime was on German 
soil and the government was forced to act and bungled in its rescue attempt.  This was an eye-
opener as not only Germany but many other governments realized how insufficient their 
response capabilities were.  As a consequence, several countries developed elite rapid-reaction 
hostage rescue teams.  In short, during this period, governments’ counterterrorism efforts 
consisted mainly in improving responses to groups hijacking international flights, taking 
hostages, and raiding embassies.  At that time, the terrorists’ primary intention was not to kill, but 
rather to raise attention for their cause by playing to the media and blackmailing governments 
into acceding to their political demands before worldwide television audiences.
Over time the nature of international terrorism changed and so too did counterterrorism.[14]  It 
appeared that terrorists were no longer taking people hostage or hijacking airplanes as the 
primary tactic to achieve their goals.  These tactics offered diminishing returns and no success in 
achieving the terrorists’ primary political objectives.  Palestinian militants quickly realized that 
hostage takings and hijackings were little more than a nuisance to governments.
  
New groups, such as Hamas, introduced more lethal tactics like suicide bombings with the 
intention of achieving at least the same level of limited strategic success that Hezbollah and the 
Tamil Tigers had reached by using suicide strategies.[15]  Al-Qaeda also started attacking the 
United States, aiming at mass-casualty terrorism from the 1990s onward, which culminated with 
the theatrically orchestrated 9/11 attacks.  In 1995, the Japanese religious cult Aum-Shinrikyo 
carried out a Sarin gas attack on a Tokyo subway system, apparently with the intention of 
causing mass casualties.  Terrorism had evolved into a more lethal and indiscriminate form of 
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predicament to respond forcefully to an enemy that it did not entirely understand.
The evolution of counterterrorism over the past forty years  was a slow process that involved 
adapting to the nature of international terrorism, as well as taking advantage of new 
advancements in military technology.  The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) played a 
significant role in this evolution.  The RMA is associated with new advancements in military 
technologies.  It began in the 1970s during the nuclear stalemate between America and the Soviet 
Union when it was becoming clear that possession of nuclear weapons offered little strategic or 
political advantage over the other since using them would have drastic consequences.  The 
answer, for America, was to develop more conventional weapons capabilities that the USSR did 
not have or could not afford to develop.  This, it was assumed, would ultimately give them the 
upper hand in the event of a conventional war.[16]  Yet the new weapons had to be politically 
and morally acceptable, i.e. they had to be precise, minimize collateral damage, and reduce the 
risk of death by the military personnel delivering them.[17]  They had to make war “bloodless, 
risk-free and precise as possible.”[18] These military capabilities, combined with modern 
advancements in computer technology, were the kicker in the RMA, because if linked into 
precision-guided weaponry, military commanders could, in theory, orchestrate the battlefield in 
real-time from a safe distance.  These advancements in military technologies are what Michael 
Ignatieff dubbed “virtual war,” meaning “a war without death – to our side – is a war that ceases 
to be fully real to us.”[19] 
After 9/11 the evolution of counterterrorism became more apparent.  Michael Boyle argues “the 
development of counterterrorism as a model of warfare is new to the post-September 11 era.”[20]   
Peter Bergen dubs counterterrorism in the post-9/11 world as “The Drone War”; some have even 
characterized the Obama administration’s over-reliance on drones as the “Obama Doctrine.”  
Indeed, the use of unmanned aerial Predator and Reaper drones by the US military and CIA has 
revolutionized how America combats terrorism; it can be seen as a new tactic in counterterrorism 
warfare.  But using unmanned drones is not the first attempt by America to use the benefits of the 
RMA to respond to international terrorism.  Before 9/11, President Bill Clinton ordered a one-
off, precision-guided cruise missile attack aimed at Al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan in response to 
the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.  The use of unmanned 
drones has had interesting implications on the development of counterterrorism strategies not 
only in the unpopular Bush administration, but as highlighted above, the Obama administration 
has considered drone warfare to be “the only game in town”.  
“President Obama has not only continued the drone program,” writes Peter Bergen, “he has 
ratcheted it up further.”  He goes on to say that in 2007 “there were three drone strikes in 
Pakistan; in 2008, there were 34; and, in the first months of 2009, the Obama administration has 
already authorized 16.”[21] At the time of writing, in 2010 alone, the Obama administration has 
authorized over one-hundred drone strikes worldwide.  The large majority of them have occurred 
in the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.[22]  Regardless of the controversy 
surrounding these operations, American drone strikes have been successful to a certain extent.  
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near Kabul, two months after the 9/11 attacks.  In 2002, Abu Ali Al Harethi, a suspected 
mastermind of the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, was killed in Yemen - the first drone operation 
outside of Afghanistan.  Kamal Derwish, an American citizen, was also killed in the attack - the 
first American citizen to be killed by a CIA-orchestrated drone strike.[23]  Drone strikes have 
also been seen as successful.  Since 2008, according to Bergen, “U.S. drones have killed dozens 
of lower-ranking militants and at least ten mid-and upper-level leaders within Al Qaeda or the 
Taliban.”[24]
However, it is debatable whether the drone strikes will prove strategically successful in the long-
term, due to their often-unintended consequences.  Killing AQ leaders and rank-and-file 
members might be considered a ‘success’ in the short-term, but they can be replaced relatively 
quickly.  Drone strikes can also lead to collateral damage, killing innocent bystanders who are 
presumably not affiliated with AQ or its leaders, which could alienate the local population or 
blunt the effectiveness of more population-centric strategies such as state-building and 
counterinsurgency, which focuses on winning the legitimacy of the local population and 
promoting good governance.  Yet it remains to be seen if drone attacks alone are sustainable.  In 
order to identify, locate, and target AQ and its affiliates from the air in regions like Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen, America needs effective and timely human intelligence.  
Drone strikes are also questionable from an ethical and international law perspective because 
operations are deadly – capitulation to a drone is not possible.  Such strikes may well violate the 
sovereignty of a state like Pakistan, which allows America to carry out attacks in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which has historically been an autonomous region outside 
the authority of the Pakistani government.  Yet the Pakistani government has yet to authorize 
strikes in Baluchistan which is a hotbed for Islamic extremism in Pakistan proper.  At the end of 
the day, an advanced drone program is an operational tool, and a campaign of targeted strikes can 
provide a counterterrorism strategy with some innovative and timely successes. Yet drone 
operations are a tactic, not an overarching strategy.  Moreover, the changes in the nature of 
counterterrorism raise a larger question of the nature of power in modern counterterrorism 
operations.  If counterterrorism is indeed an all-encompassing approach requiring all aspects of a 
nation’s power, then it is important to understand both the hard and soft power options of 
counterterrorism.
Hard and Soft Power in Counterterrorism
Existing research on counterterrorism tends to structure debates around two approaches: the war 
(or military) model and the criminal justice model.[25]  The war model tends to frame the 
struggle against terrorism in military terms of an enemy-centric war where the armed forces of a 
state are primarily in charge of developing counterterrorism strategy. On the other hand, the 
criminal justice model champions the rule of law and democratic values which prevail in Western 
democracies.  Doing so puts restrictions on the government and thereby risks reducing the 
effectiveness of counterterrorism measures.  However, as Ami Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstorp 
have argued, both models rarely function according to academic theory during an actual 
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preservation of civil liberties, their attempts to combat terrorism forcefully have continually 
tested the boundaries of the criminal justice model.[26]
There is a need to view counterterrorism from other angles.  It is becoming increasingly clear 
that a new framework is needed in order to develop and measure successful counterterrorism 
strategies.[27]  Considering the evolution of counterterrorism, it could be more useful to view 
counterterrorism in terms of “hard” and “soft” power.  This would require restructuring the 
debate around a direct and indirect approach to counterterrorism.[28]  The direct approach would 
be an enemy-centric doctrine consisting of primarily offensive, hard power tactics such as 
Predator and Reaper drone strikes, special forces operations, increased policing and intelligence 
operations.  These are useful tools if the goal is to isolate and destroy groups like Al-Qaeda.  The 
indirect soft power approach would consist of population-centric methods, and would contain 
features such as capacity building, economic development, and counter-radicalization focusing 
on the underlying causes that allow terrorism to thrive. 
The direct approach to counterterrorism is straightforward but it raises serious questions 
regarding the ethical and legal use of force – on top of the issue of collection of intelligence and 
the protection of civil liberties within a democratic society.  On the other hand, it remains to be 
seen if soft power alternatives such as democracy promotion, economic development, and 
counter-radicalization effectively address the ill-defined “root causes” of terrorism.  Robert 
Jervis argues that even if political oppression, weak states, poverty, and economic inequality 
were the real root causes, “there is little reason to think that we could deal with them 
effectively”. He concludes that “we cannot point to solid evidence that doing so would make 
much difference.”[29] This is not to say that American involvement internationally would not 
include some form of economic and development assistance in weak and failing nations.  But it 
is difficult to give aid to weak states like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen and expect to be able 
to determine effectiveness in terms of countering Al-Qaeda’s  terrorism.  Moreover, providing 
development aid to increase capacity building is questionable from a counterterrorism 
perspective since a causal link between weak states and terrorism cannot be proven.  Aid may 
well increase the standard of living, level of education and general quality of life in some 
countries. Yet it is difficult to argue that locals would turn to terrorism or political violence 
without it.  Furthermore, such root cause theories would have to address the fact that homegrown 
terrorists do indeed radicalize and carry out attacks in democratic countries as well as weak and 
failing nations – and that while poverty and economic inequality are prevalent throughout the 
world, terrorism is not.[30]  It may be more useful from a counterterrorism perspective to view 
terrorists as rational actors who adopt the tactic of terrorism as a strategic choice to pursue 
political objectives, not as passive observers who are susceptible to what the supposed 
underlying causes forces them to do.[31]
Then there is the issue of counter-radicalization and de-radicalization in counterterrorism.  Some 
argue that terrorist radicalization and de-radicalization should be viewed as a complex process 
consisting of a variety of interdependent push- and pull-factors and triggering events that drive 
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better explain how individuals are violently radicalized.[33]  So far theories of radicalization 
have had difficulties in explaining why individuals take up or leave terrorism behind. This is 
mainly due to the fact that terrorists come from a wide variety of backgrounds and there exists no 
single individual terrorist profile.[34]  Despite the absence of a single terrorist phenotype, some 
view counter-radicalization programs as a critical part of counterterrorism.  Lorenzo Vidino 
argues that attempts to dismantle terrorist networks is similar to playing a game of “whack-a-
mole” and that governments should take steps to prevent radicalization in order to stop people 
from becoming terrorists.  He goes on to argue that anti-radicalization programs would vary from 
“convening interfaith meetings to creating government-funded Muslim magazines and TV 
channels, from promoting lectures of Muslim clerics exposing the theological flaws of al Qaeda’s 
ideology to mentoring projects and professional development seminars.”[35] Theories of 
counter-radicalization also have trouble measuring success from a counterterrorism perspective, 
because such programs essentially amount to increased community engagement that requires 
community leaders to target and mentor individuals who are presumably susceptible to terrorism 
recruitment. Yet it is difficult to prove that they would have turned to terrorism in the first place, 
and, more importantly, that they will not engage in terrorism afterwards.
Some go a step further and look at ways soft power can facilitate an exit for individuals from 
terrorist groups, arguing that government counterterrorism programs should offer terrorists a 
pathway out of terrorism by facilitating disengagement and rehabilitation.[36]  While research on 
disengagement, de-radicalization, and rehabilitation is in the early stages, it is realistic that 
(local) government can play a crucial role in facilitate pathways out of terrorism for groups and 
individuals who want to leave terrorism behind.[37]  In Lebanon, soft approaches such as 
political engagement and increased capacity building might have some influence on bringing 
about Hezbollah’s disarmament and its full integration into the Lebanese political system. Yet the 
fact remains that Hezbollah already chose to join the political process in Lebanon many years 
ago and has yet to decommission its militia.[38]  Similarly, attempts to weaken and isolate 
Hamas have proved questionable from a hard power perspective. Hamas showed in 2006 that it 
could use democracy to its benefit without having to moderate its political aims or renounce 
violence.  The FMLN in Central America, on the other hand, decommissioned its militia and 
joined a democratic system in the early 1990; it is now one of the largest political parties in El 
Salvador.  So the record is mixed on whether democracy can offer groups a pathway out of 
terrorism. Yet it is reasonable to assume that some soft power measures could indeed offer 
certain individuals and groups some sort of pathway out of terrorism.  
While both hard and soft power measures in counterterrorism do not necessarily provide a 
magical way to defeat terrorism, such a framework can be a useful way to characterize and 
analyze counterterrorism initiatives.  In the context of countering Al-Qaeda terrorism, however, it 
seems America prefers hard power to soft power.  One of Al-Qaeda’s primary goals is to reverse 
American foreign policy and its influence in the Middle East while overthrowing corrupt Arab 
regimes it supports.[39]  But it is clear, and rightfully so, that American government has little 
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billion in military sales to Saudi Arabia - the largest military sales package ever for an Arab state
[40]. According to Bob Woodward’s new book Obama’s Wars, the CIA has Presidential and 
Congressional approval to carry out covert, lethal counterterrorism operations in over sixty 
countries. It also manages a 3,000-man team of Afghans known as Counterterrorism Pursuit 
Teams (CTPT). Its purpose is to take the fight to Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  In short, 
it appears that for the time being aerial drone strikes and other hard power tools will drive 
American counterterrorism strategy.[41]
Nevertheless, America should be mindful that counterterrorism operations that cause high 
civilian casualties rates allow terrorists to exploit its actions and to strengthen their own position 
from a propaganda perspective. There is a fine line between effectively responding to terrorism 
and strategic overreach.  John Brennan, President Obama’s top counterterrorism advisor, recently 
commented on the need to resist using the “hammer” in counterterrorism.  He went on to argue 
that America must use the “scalpel” and prepare for a long struggle against Al-Qaeda, a struggle 
that would take the fight from the battlegrounds of counterinsurgency into the shadows of more 
covert counter terrorist operations.[42]  However, this does not mean that more precise is 
necessarily less lethal. While post-modern terrorists may want a lot of people watching and a lot 
of people dead, covert counterterrorism forces now want few people watching and a lot of 
terrorists dead.
Counterinsurgency Theory
How does counterinsurgency differ from counterterrorism?  Counterinsurgency has been defined 
as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a 
government to defeat an insurgency.”[43]  Based on this definition, counterinsurgency is an all-
encompassing approach to countering irregular insurgent warfare – an approach which 
recognizes that a military solution to a conflict is not feasible; only a combined military, 
political, and civilian solution is possible.  Seth Jones of the RAND Corporation has argued that, 
based on his analysis of 90 insurgencies, defeating an insurgency is a long process that lasts on 
average 14 years.[44]  T. E. Lawrence has been quoted as saying “to make war upon rebellion is 
messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.”[45]
There are several studies that highlight the best practices of waging counterinsurgency warfare.  
David Galula, a former Lieutenant Colonel in the French army, is considered the intellectual God 
Father of counterinsurgency studies.  In his famous book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory 
and Practice (1964), Galula argued that, in order to counter an insurgency, it was essential for 
the counterinsurgent to win the support and legitimacy of the local population, promote good 
governance, and keep a sufficient amount of troops in an area to provide security after the 
governments forces have taken it over.  He also argues that is important to “destroy or expel the 
main body of armed insurgents” or, if that is not possible, to “win over or suppress the last 
insurgent remnants.”[46] These principles provided the intellectual framework for countries like 
America and Britain to further develop and implement their respective counterinsurgency 
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Petraeus’s “clear, hold, and build” strategy.  
John Nagl, building on Galula’s work, argues that there are two approaches to 
counterinsurgency: the direct and indirect approach.  The direct approach focuses primarily on 
defeating the enemy with military force.  The indirect approach, on the other hand, involving a 
“battle for the hearts and minds,” focuses on a more population-centric strategy. It involves 
denying the insurgency the support of the local population while at the same time attacking the 
insurgency with military force.[47]  The primary goal of both the insurgent and the 
counterinsurgent is promoting good governance and winning legitimacy in the eyes of the local 
population.  This framework for victory has been the primary focus of American 
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  As a consequence, General Petraeus’s 
declaratory strategy has revolved around denying the insurgency its sanctuary within the 
population and training the local security services to hold the territory so the insurgents do not 
return, while building infrastructure, promoting good governance, and eliminating political 
corruption – thereby wining the population’s “hearts and minds.”
Counterinsurgency theory can be seen within a classical and modern framework.  Classical 
counterinsurgency theory is similar to both the Nagl and Petraeus approaches.  Since a classical 
insurgency is generally associated with a struggle within one state, with a possible safe haven in 
a bordering state, a classical counterinsurgency is confined within the borders of a single state.  
Seth Jones, in his analysis of 90 insurgencies, identified three key variables that are, in theory, 
critical to a successful classical counterinsurgency: 1) training the local police and security forces 
to combat the insurgency; 2) improving the quality of local governance; and, 3) denying the 
insurgency any external support and outside sanctuary.[48]  Jones goes on to argue that America 
is not likely to commit itself to a 14-year long counterinsurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan, or 
Pakistan.  Thus, in his view, training and supporting the host government’s security forces to 
defeat the insurgency is critical.  Locals have more legitimacy and are more familiar with the 
local geography, language, culture, political landscape, and history.  They are simply more 
capable of gathering intelligence from the local population and thus should take the lead in any 
long-term counterinsurgency effort.
Modern counterinsurgency theory, on the other hand, takes a more international approach.  After 
9/11, Al-Qaeda’s network across national borders was characterized by many as a global 
insurgency.[49]  This new insurgency threat was not only local, it was international, which as 
some argue, requires a re-thinking of how such irregular warfare should be combated.[50]  Many 
counterinsurgency experts acknowledge that as the nature of an insurgency evolves so too does 
the counterinsurgency strategy[51]  Indeed, Kilcullen’s observation that “a globalized insurgency 
demands a rethink of traditional counterinsurgency” appears to make sense if one subscribes to 
the argument that Al-Qaeda is a global Islamist insurgency.[52]  Bruce Hoffman recently framed 
the global Al-Qaeda threat in a similar way, and argued that while AQ does not enjoy the 
operational safe-haven it did before 9/11, it has “nevertheless been able to reconstitute its global 
terrorist reach.”[53]  As such, Hoffman argues that a new Global Counterinsurgency (GCOIN) 
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information operations to counter the radical narratives; separating the enemy from its support 
base to deny it sanctuaries and freedom of movement; continuing to detect and defuse the enemy 
domestically and internationally; and a commitment to build legitimate civil governance which 
could counter the underlying causes of terrorism and insurgency.[54]  This modern approach is 
basically a classical counterinsurgency theory of winning the “hearts and minds,” which denies 
the enemy sanctuary, seeking to promote good governance and engaging in information 
operations -  but on a global scale.  It is a much more ambitious undertaking than conducting 
classical counterinsurgency within a single state. However, it also remains to be seen whether 
AQ merits this type of attention and whether it really amounts to a global Islamist insurgency.
If we consider Al-Qaeda a serious global insurgency threat that has the resources and support to 
overthrow multiples governments worldwide, then it is certainly reasonable to adopt both 
Kilcullen and Hoffman’s approaches.  However, if we do so it blurs even further the line between 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency because it not only inhibits our understanding of both 
doctrines, it requires us to develop a new form of hybrid warfare.  Just because an organization 
such as Al-Qaeda may use terrorism on an international scale and dabble in domestic 
insurgencies does not make it subject to the same respective counter strategies.  Furthermore, to a 
certain extent, labeling Al-Qaeda as a globalized insurgency threat legitimizes Al-Qaeda’s cause 
and gives this organization or network too much credit.  “The Al-Qaeda organization is neither 
an insurgency against a US hegemonic order nor the vanguard of a global Islamic resistance to 
globalization and westernization,” Michael Boyle has argued.  “It is a resilient and highly lethal 
terrorist organization with a fanciful political programme and relatively little popular support in 
the Muslim world.”[55]
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency
Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are two fundamentally different doctrines and it is 
important to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each in order to fully appreciate the 
offsetting effects they might have.  Michael Boyle has recently asked the question whether 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together, and concluded that there is no reason to 
think that both strategies are fully compatible or mutually reinforcing, and despite the recent 
conflation of the two doctrines, that a counterinsurgency strategy should not be seen as a 
counterterrorism strategy and vice-versa.[56]  Counterinsurgency can provide a clear framework 
for success if the situation is ripe for this type of warfare.  The main tenet of counterinsurgency 
recognizes that a sole military solution is not feasible, making it essential for a dual military-
political solution that adopts a population-centric approach.  Additionally, counterinsurgency 
doctrine rests on a few key pillars of protecting the local population, promoting good 
governance, eliminating enemy safe-havens, and training the locals to take the fight to the 
insurgency.  Classical counterinsurgency seeks to combat an insurgency confined within the 
borders a nation-state, while modern counterinsurgency theory takes these classical principles 
and applies them at the international level, or what Bruce Hoffman calls Global 
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addressing the underlying socio-economic conditions that supposedly allow terrorism to thrive.  
Counterterrorism, on the other hand, provides a less clear framework for success but is equally 
complex.  Counterterrorism has evolved over the past four decades into a more lethal form of 
unconventional warfare.  Not surprisingly, this evolution has mirrored the trends in international 
terrorism.  Since international terrorists from the late 1960s to roughly the end of the Cold War 
were primarily hijacking airplanes, raiding embassies, and taking hostages to promote their 
causes, counterterrorism forces adjusted to meet these threats.  Yet over the past few decades 
terrorism has become bloodier and more indiscriminate, which forced governments to adjust 
their counter tactics.  With the RMA developing unmanned, precision-guided weaponry that 
drastically decreases the risk of one’s own soldiers dying in conflict on the ground, 
counterterrorism was able to evolve into a form of irregular warfare that is, as Michael Ignatieff 
described the RMA, as “bloodless, risk-free and precise as possible.”[57] Instead of hostage 
negotiators being called to deal with a terrorist’s demands, now a soldier operates unmanned 
aerial Predator and Reaper drones with Hellfire missiles to seek and destroy Al-Qaeda terrorists.  
Counterterrorism today is indeed a complex, multifaceted phenomenon.  In the context of 
combating Al-Qaeda, counterterrorism is a sharp, quick, and lethal form of warfare focused on 
isolating, boxing in, and destroying the organization and its members.  However, 
counterterrorism is something entirely different when thinking in terms of dealing with the 
complexities of Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as the hard and soft power alternatives that an all-
encompassing strategy can bring to bear.
Recently the debate between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency advocates has gained 
traction within the Obama administration.  Some argue that a long-term counterinsurgency is the 
only way to achieve America’s goals in Afghanistan, while others argue that it does little to 
address the global threat posed by Al-Qaeda. For this a number of reasons can be cited.  First, 
Afghanistan has been a “nightmare, a graveyard of empires,” ranging from the Brits to the 
Soviets and now, potentially also to the Americans.[58]  No one has ever effectively ruled 
Afghanistan. The country is so diverse in terms of its tribal structures that no unified state has 
ever been formed.  Second, based on the counterinsurgency principles, success in Afghanistan 
requires certain underlying conditions that America currently does not have and cannot create.  
For example, having a legitimate host government is the bedrock of any successful 
counterinsurgency strategy. However, the current Karzai regime has been criticized for being 
extremely corrupt and for having made little progress in development.[59]
A recent poll of 6,500 Afghans conducted in 34 of the 36 provinces put the police and judiciary 
as the most corrupt departments in the Afghan government. These are the very entities 
responsible for implementing the rule of law.[60]  Different U.S. governmental agencies in 
Afghanistan also appear to be working at cross-purposes.  For example, the CIA has been 
funding Hamid Karzai’s corrupt brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, who is essentially the governor of 
Kandahar City, to provide security, collect intelligence, and combat the Taliban using his local 
militias.  But the military, at the same time, is working to promote legitimate governance and win 
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are going to conduct a population-centric strategy in Afghanistan and we are perceived as 
backing thugs, then we are just undermining ourselves.”[61] Furthermore, CIA drone operations 
used for counterterrorism purposes are not only highly lethal but also have a tendency to cause 
unintended civilian causalities.  Therefore, while targeted drone strikes that have relatively high 
levels of collateral damage may be seen as a necessary evil for a successful counterterrorism 
strategy, it essentially blunts the effectiveness of the nearby counterinsurgency operation since it 
has the potential to further alienate the local population.[62]
Third, the costs of a long-term commitment to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan are astronomic.  
As Kalev Sepp has argued, “If – as in Iraq – counterinsurgency means a campaign that will cost 
$2 trillion, engage 150,000 troops, see the deaths of some 5,000 of those soldiers, and last for at 
least six years with an indeterminate end, then only the United States can do it, and probably 
only once in a generation.”[63] According to Bob Woodward’s new book on the Obama 
administration, President Obama has been quoted as saying, in relation to the war in Afghanistan: 
"I'm not doing long-term nation-building. I am not spending a trillion dollars."[64] Due to the 
costs of counterinsurgency warfare, as the argument goes, the United States is not likely to 
sustain an international coalition or the international legitimacy required that some argue is 
critical to succeeding in Afghanistan.  Fourth, counterinsurgency is “clearly not working” writes 
Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations.[65]  Haass goes on to argue that 
America must stop thinking that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda represent the same security threat to 
Afghanistan and to its national security interests in the region, and that the Taliban is not likely to 
harbor Al-Qaeda again because of the enormous consequences.  
Above all, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies must keep in mind the current 
threat that Al-Qaeda poses.  CIA Director Leon Panetta estimated that Al-Qaeda has only “60 to 
100, maybe less” members in Afghanistan.[66]  And a recent estimate put its size in both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan at fewer than 500.[67]  So if the mission in Afghanistan is to disrupt, 
dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda, as President Obama has stated, then a strategy focusing on this 
threat seems to be more feasible and have a higher likelihood of success.  However, some have 
argued that the size of Al-Qaeda’s membership in Afghanistan and Pakistan is not necessary a 
productive method to measure its strength.  Al-Qaeda has never had more than a few hundred 
core members and it continues to use affiliate organizations to project its terrorist brand 
internationally.[68]  Whatever its size, as America’s battle against Al-Qaeda continues 
worldwide, it seems counterinsurgency warfare will be marginalized for a more enemy-centric 
counterterrorism strategy which will utilize a variety of hard and soft power tactics to disrupt, 
dismantle, and destroy Al-Qaeda.
Conclusion
The line between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy has become increasingly 
blurred, yet as we have seen, both concepts represent two different strategic doctrines.  However, 
the increased focus on counterinsurgency warfare after 9/11 has affected how we view current 
PERSPECTIVES	 ﾠON	 ﾠTERRORISM	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Volume	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠIssue	 ﾠ5
44	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ November	 ﾠ2010counterterrorism efforts.  At the heart of any counterinsurgency strategy is a “hearts and minds” 
approach of promoting good governance and gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the local 
population.  This way of thinking appears to have had a certain impact on the development of 
more soft power counterterrorism measures, which now seek to promote legitimate governance 
and capacity building to address the somewhat unclear underlying causes of terrorism.  Indeed, 
Daniel Benjamin, the U.S. State Department’s Coordinator of Counterterrorism, writes that 
America must address the complex factors of radicalization and “confront the political, social, 
and economic conditions that our enemies exploit to win over recruits and funders” by increasing 
“foreign assistance to nations and communities where violent extremism has made inroads, such 
as Pakistan and Yemen.”[69] This view reinforces the notion that American can effectively 
address its terrorism problems by changing the facts on the ground.  Yet, in reality, this only 
highlights the State Department’s strategy for countering Al-Qaeda terrorism, which at the end of 
the day assumes a dubious causal linkage between socio-economic and political conditions and 
terrorism, and appears to be at odds with the more hard power approaches used by the CIA and 
American military.
However, critical questions remain regarding American counterterrorism strategy.  Will the hard 
power counterterrorism tactics such as Predator drone strikes used by the CIA blunt the 
effectiveness of the State Department’s soft approach to counterterrorism?  In contrast to 
counterinsurgency doctrine, does America really need the support and legitimacy of a local 
population in order to be successful in counterterrorism?[70]  If so, can America and its allies 
develop a realistic framework to counter extremism and violent radicalization?  If not, to what 
extent can hard power tactics prove strategically successful?  Can both hard and soft power in 
counterterrorism be fully compatible and mutually reinforcing, or will both always operate at 
cross-purposes?  And, more importantly, just because local populations in regions like 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia may have extremist views or despise American 
foreign policy, does that necessarily mean they will join Al-Qaeda and resort to international 
terrorism?  In short, the larger task for America and its allies will be to find adequate answers to 
such questions and determine what the long, perhaps multigenerational struggle against 
international terrorism will look like after the war in Afghanistan, and, in this way, move beyond 
the current debate surrounding counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.
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Introduction
Who is doing research – academic and otherwise – on terrorism? The field of terrorism research 
is broad and ever-expanding. Governments sponsor intelligence-driven analytical research 
agencies. Commercial intelligence firms like Jane’s, sell their research to corporate and 
governmental clients. There are think tanks like RAND, which work closely with government 
agencies. An increasing number of universities house terrorism research centres, the oldest one 
being the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. 
Andrews. Then there are virtual networks, such as the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), that 
try to create synergies between a wide array of researchers and topics. 
Beyond organizational makeup, notable differences in research approach also exist ,For instance, 
the gulf between those who work as contractors for homeland security departments and those 
who work in the policy world. Or, the gap between those who work with classified intelligence 
and those who work only with open source material. Then there is a divide between those who 
are considered ‘orthodox’ scholars and those who call themselves ‘critical terrorism 
scholars’(CTS). The latter, at times,  call the former ‘terrorologists’; those, in turn, label some 
from  the CTS school  ‘hypocritical’.
Considering the proliferation of government agencies, private firms, research organizations and 
internet-based initiatives, the number of newcomers to the field of Terrorism Studies is 
substantial. Some focus on more general issues like social conflict, armed conflict or political 
violence topics that often include terrorism-related research. Still others maintain a national, 
regional, or even global, focus. Much work comes from English-speaking countries and Israel, 
while other parts of the world are notably under-represented. Trying to create an inventory of 
such a broad spectrum of research organizations also proves challenging as there are several 
website-only “centres” directed by a single individual with little visible  – or ‘credible’ – output. 
In the following list we present a collection of 100 centres, organisations, institutes, programs 
and projects that seek to expand the research community’s collective knowledge of terrorism, 
counterterrorism, political violence, radicalisation and asymmetric conflict. In an attempt to 
provide an overview, a broad array of entities beyond proper academic research centres and 
institutes have been included. Though many of the entries on this list may receive government 
funding, state agencies and departments involved in terrorism research have not been included. 
Our list is incomplete and, as such, might leave off centres well worth including. We have tried 
to include only credible, professional organizations though might not have been fully successful 
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Centre Project, Program, Issue Affiliated Organisation, 
Institute
Location
Bangladesh Centre for Terrorism 
Research (BCTR)
Bangladesh Institute of Peace and 
Security Studies
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Center for Advancing Microbial Risk 
Assessment (CAMRA)
Michigan State University; 
Carnegie Mellon University; 
Drexel University; Northern 
Arizona University; University of 
Arizona; University of California 
at Berkeley; University of 
Michigan
East Lansing, 
Michigan, United 
States
Center for Applied Counterterrorism 
Studies (CACS)
University of North Carolina at 
Charlotte
Charlotte, North 
Carolina, United 
States
Center for Asymmetric Warfare 
(CAW)
Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, 
California, United 
States
Center for Counter-Terrorism 
Studies
China Institute of Contemporary 
International Relations
Beijing, China
Center for Interdisciplinary Policy, 
Education, and Research on 
Terrorism (CIPERT)
Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security and the Center on 
Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, 
Naval Postgraduate School; 
Pacific Graduate School of 
Psychology
Center for International Research on 
Terrorism (ITRC)
University of Cincinnati; Turkish 
National Police Organization
Center for Law and Counterterrorism 
(CLC)
Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies
Washington, DC, 
United States
Center for Policing Terrorism (CPT) Manhattan Institute New York City, 
New York, United 
States
Center for Terrorism Law (CTL) St. Mary's University San Antonio, Texas, 
United States
Center for Terrorism Research 
(CTR)
Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies
Wollongong, 
Australia
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Institute
Location
Center on Global Counterterrorism 
Cooperation
Washington, DC, 
United States
Center on Terrorism John Jay College of Criminal 
Justice
New York City, 
New York, United 
States
Center on Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism
Foreign Policy Research Institute Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, 
United States
Center on Terrorism and Irregular 
Warfare
Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, 
California, United 
States
Centre for Asymmetric Threat 
Studies (CATS)
Swedish National Defence 
College
Stockholm, Sweden
Centre for Policing, Intelligence and 
Counter Terrorism (PICT)
Macquarie University, Sydney, 
Australia
Sydney, Australia
Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation and Contemporary 
Political Violence (CSRV)
Aberystwyth University Aberystwyth, 
Ceredigion, United 
Kingdom
Centre for Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism (CTC)
Campus The Hague of Leiden 
University, Netherlands
The Hague, 
Netherlands
Centre for the Study of Terrorism 
and Political Violence (CSTPV)
University of St. Andrews, 
Scotland
St. Andrews, 
Scotland
Centre for the Study of Terrorism 
(CFSOT)
London, England
Center for the Study of Youth and 
Political Violence
University of Tennessee - 
Knoxville
Knoxville, 
Tennessee, United 
States
Centre for Transnational Crime 
Prevention (CTCP)
Wollongong, 
Australia
Center for Higher Study on the 
Struggle against Terrorism and 
Political Violence (Centro Alti Studi 
per a Lotta al Terrorismo e alla 
Violenza Politica)
Rome, Italy
Charity & Security Network (CSN) Washington, DC, 
United States
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Chicago Project on Security and 
Terrorism (CPOST)
University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois, 
United States
Columbia University World Trade 
Center Archive Project
Columbia University New York City, 
New York, United 
States
Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) 
at West Point
United States Military Academy West Point, New 
York, United States
Consortium for Countering the 
Financing of Terrorism (CCFT)
Singapore
Consortium for Strategic 
Communication (CSC)
Hugh Downs School of Human 
Communication, Arizona State 
University
Tempe, Arizona, 
United States
Counterterrorism and Homeland 
Security
Cato Institute Washington, DC, 
United States
Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative American Strategy Program, New 
American Foundation
Washington, DC, 
United States
Counterterrorism Topic Human Rights Watch New York City, 
New York, United 
States
Dark Web Terrorism Research Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, 
Eller College of Management, 
University of Arizona
Tucson, Arizona, 
United States
Future of Terrorism Project (FTP) Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies
Washington, DC, 
United States
GCC Security and Terrorism Issues 
Research Program
Gulf Research Center
Global Terrorism Analysis Program Jamestown Foundation Washington, DC, 
United States
Global Terrorism Research Centre 
(GTReC)
Monash University, Australia Melbourne, 
Victoria, Australia
Global Terrorism Subtopic National Security Issue, Center 
for American Progress
Washington, DC, 
United States
Homegrown Terror & Radicalization 
Topic
Homeland Security Policy 
Institute, George Washington 
University
Washington, DC, 
United States
Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism Program
Defense and Security Program, 
Center for Strategic and 
International Studies
Washington, DC, 
United States
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Homeland Security and Terrorism 
Program
James A. Baker III Institute for 
Public Policy, Rice University
Houston, Texas, 
United States
Institute for National Security and 
Counterterrorism (INSCT)
Syracuse University Syracuse, New 
York, United States
Institute for the Study of Violent 
Groups (ISVG)
University of New Haven New Haven, 
Connecticut, 
United States
Institut fur Terrorismusforschung & 
Sicherheitspolitik (IFTUS)
Essen, Germany
Institute of Terrorism Research and 
Response (ITRR)
Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, 
United States
Inter-American Committee Against 
Terrorism (CICTE)
Organization of American States Washington, DC, 
United States
International Association for 
Counterterrorism & Security 
Professionals (IACSP)
International Center for Terrorism 
Studies (ICTS)
Potomac Institute for Policy 
Studies
Arlington, Virginia, 
United States
International Center for the Study of 
Terrorism (ICST)
Pennsylvania State University State College, 
Pennsylvania, 
United States
International Center of Terror 
Medicine
Hadassah Medical Center Jerusalem, Israel
International Centre for Political 
Violence and Terrorism Research 
(ICPVTR)
S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, Nanyang 
Technological University, 
Singapore
Singapore
International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation (ICSR)
King’s College, London; 
University of Pennsylvania; 
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya; 
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy
London, England
International Institute for Counter-
terrorism (ICT)
Interdisciplinary Center Center Herzliya, Israel
Investigative Project on Terrorism 
(IPT)
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Italian Team for Security, Terroristic 
Issues & Managing Emergencies 
(ITSTIME)
Catholic University of Milan Milan, Italy
Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency 
Centre
London, England
Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor 
(JTTM)
Middle East Media Research 
Institute
Washington, DC, 
United States
Mackenzie Institute Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada
Maritime Terrorism Research Center
Meir Amit Intelligence & Terrorism 
Information Center (ITIC)
Israel Intelligence Heritage & 
Commemoration Center
Gelilot, Israel
Memorial Institute for the Prevention 
of Terrorism (MIPT)
Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, United 
States
Monterey Terrorism Research and 
Education Program (MonTREP)
Monterey Institute of 
International Studies
Monterey, 
California, United 
States
National Center for Foreign Animal 
and Zoonotic Disease Defense 
(FAZD Center)
Texas A&M University College Station, 
Texas, United 
States
National Center for Risk and 
Economic Analysis of Terrorism 
Events (CREATE)
University of Southern California Los Angeles, 
California, United 
States
National Center on the Psychology 
of Terrorism (NCPT)
Center for Interdisciplinary 
Policy, Education, and Research 
on Terrorism
National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START)
University of Maryland College Park, 
Maryland, United 
States
National Terrorism Preparedness 
Institute (NTPI)
St. Petersburg College St. Petersburg, 
Florida, United 
States
Nine Eleven Finding Answers 
(NEFA) Foundation
Washington, DC, 
United States
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Philippine Institute for Peace, 
Violence and Terrorism Research, 
Inc. (PIPVTR)
Teachers Village 
East, Diliman, 
Quezon City, 
Philippines
Program for Terrorism Research & 
Studies
Faculty of Economics and 
Political Science, Cairo 
University
Cairo, Egypt
Program on International Terrorism Elcano Royal Institute Madrid, Spain
Project Fikra Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy
Washington, DC, 
United States
Quilliam Foundation London, England
Radicalization Watch Project (RWP) Center for Advanced Defense 
Studies
Washington, DC, 
United States
Russia-Eurasia Terror Watch 
(RETWA)
Society for Terrorism Research 
(STR)
Boston, 
Massachusetts, 
United States
Stein Program on Counterterrorism 
and Intelligence
Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy
Washington, DC, 
United States
Terrorism, Transnational Crime and 
Corruption Center (TraCCC)
George Mason University Fairfax, Virginia, 
United States
Terrorism & National Security Nelson Center for International 
and Public Affairs, James 
Madison University
Harrisonburg, 
Virginia, United 
States
Terrorism & Preparedness Data 
Resource Center
University of Michigan Inter-
university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research
Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, United 
States
Terrorism and Counter-
Radicalization Issue
Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace
Washington, DC, 
United States
Terrorism and Crime Studies Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress
Washington, DC, 
United States
Terrorism and Homeland Security 
Research Area
RAND Corporation
Terrorism and Internal Security 
Research Cluster
Institute for Defence Studies & 
Analyses
New Delhi, India
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Terrorism Issue Council on Foreign Relations New York City, 
New York, United 
States
Terrorism Issue Heritage Foundation Washington, DC, 
United States
Terrorism Issue Institute of Peace & Conflict 
Studies
New Delhi, India
Terrorist Media Project Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies
Washington, DC, 
United States
Terrorism Page Anti-Defamation League New York City, 
New York, United 
States
Terrorism Program Center for Defense Information Washington, DC, 
United States
Terrorism Research Center (TRC) Fulbright College, University of 
Arkansas
Fayetteville, 
Arkansas, United 
States
Terrorism Research Center, Inc. 
(TRC)
Terrorism Topic Human Rights Watch New York City, 
New York, United 
States
Triangle Center on Terrorism and 
Homeland Security (TCTHS)
Duke University; University of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill; RTI 
International
Durham, North 
Carolina, United 
States
Unconventional Warfare Study 
Center
US-Russia Initiative to Prevent 
Nuclear Terrorism
Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University
Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 
United States
Violence and Extremism ProgrammeDemos London, England
Violent Intranational Political 
Conflict & Terrorism Research 
Laboratory (VIPCAT)
Institute for the Theory and 
Practice of International 
Relations, College of William and 
Mary
Williamsburg, 
Virginia, United 
States
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WMD & CBRN Terrorism Topic Homeland Security Policy 
Institute, George Washington 
University
Washington, DC, 
United States
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NB: some of the items listed below are clickable and allow access to the full text; those with an 
asterisk [*] only have a clickable table of contents.
Adelman, D.S. & Legg, T.J. (2009). Disaster nursing: a handbook for practice. Sudbury, Mass.; 
Jones and Bartlett Publishers.
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0822/2008028606.html]
Cocciardi, J.A. (2004). Weapons of mass destruction and terrorism response: field guide. 
Sudbury, Mass.; Jones and Bartlett Publishers.
Cummings, C. E. & Stikova, E. (Eds.) (2007). Strengthening national public health preparedness 
and response to chemical, biological and radiological agent threats. [NATO Advanced Study 
Institute on Strengthening National Public Health Preparedness and Response for Chemical, 
Biological and Radiological Agents Threats; 2006, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia] Amsterdam, 
Netherlands: Washington, DC.; IOS Press.
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0802/2007930109.html]
Davis, L.E. (2003). Individual preparedness and response to chemical, radiological, nuclear, and 
biological terrorist attacks: a quick guide. Santa Monica, CA.; RAND Public Safety and Justice.
Dolnik, A. (2007). Understanding terrorist innovations: technology, tactics and global trends. 
New York, NY.; Routledge.
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip072/2006034183.html]
Drielak, S.C. (2004). Hot zone forensics: chemical, biological, and radiological evidence 
collection. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas.
Dunston, A. (et al.) (Eds.) (2003). A citizen's guide to terrorism preparedness and response: 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear. New York; American Council on Science and 
Health. 
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0711/2003106430.html]
Dunston, A. (et al.) (Eds.) (2003). New Yorker's guide to terrorism preparedness and response: 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear. New York: American Council on Science and 
Health.
Dwyer, A. (2002). Jane’s Chem-bio Handbook. Coulsdon, Surrey; Jane’s Information Group.
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 ﾠ2010Fountain, A.W. & Gardner, P.J. (Eds.) Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives 
CBRNE) sensing X.[proceedings of SPIE; 14-16 April 2009, Orlando, Florida, United States.] 
Bellingham, Wash.; SPIE.
Gonenc, I.E. (et al.) (2007). Assessment of the fate and effects of toxic agents on water resources. 
[Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute on Advanced Modeling Techniques for 
Rapid Diagnosis and Assessment of CBRN Agents Effects on Water Resources, Istanbul, Turkey, 
4-16 December 2005]
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0825/2007425775-t.html]
Gowen, A.E. (2004). Surviving terrorism: recognition and response guide to chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear attacks. Lawrenceville, NJ.: Pinninti.
Howard, R.D. (2008). Weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Dubuque, IA : McGraw Hill. 
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0902/2008298857-t.html]
James, A. D. (Ed.,) (2006). Science and technology policies for the anti-terrorism era.
 [Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Science & Technology Policies for 
the Anti-Terrorism Era. Manchester, United Kingdom, 12-14 September 2004]
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0709/2006929619.html]
Jane’s Information Group (2011). Jane’s NBC Defence Systems. Coulsdon, Surrey; Jane’s 
Information Group.
Johnson, T.A. (Ed.,) (2007). National security issues in science, law, and technology. Boca 
Raton: CRC Press. 
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip073/2006035229.html]
Koenig, K.L. & Schultz, C.H. (Eds.) (2010). Koenig and Schultz's disaster medicine : 
comprehensive principles and practices. Cambridge & New York; Cambridge University Press. 
Langford, R.E. (2004) Introduction to weapons of mass destruction: radiological, chemical, and 
biological. Hoboken, N.J.; Wiley-Interscience.
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/wiley041/2004299036.html]
Lawson, J. R. & Jarboe, T.L. (2002). Aid for decontamination of fire and rescue service 
protective clothing and equipment after chemical biological, and radiological exposures. 
Boulder, CO: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Institute of 
Standards and Technology; Washington, DC.
Lebaron, W.D. (2007). Five deadly arrows of terrorism: radiological dispersion devices, 
chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, cyber terrorism: a manual of 
information and practice. New York; Nova Science Pub Inc. 
Lindstrom, G. (2004). Protecting the European homeland: the CBR dimension. Paris : Institute 
for Security Studies; European Union.
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MacArthur, S.A. (2002). Preparing for mass-casualty incidents: hospital readiness for 
biological, chemical, and radiological disasters. Marblehead, Mass.; Opus Communications.
Maniscalco, P.M. & Christen, H.T. (2006). Security officer's terrorism response guide. Sudbury, 
Mass.; Jones and Bartlett Publishers.
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip062/2005029508.html]
Maniscalco, P.M. & Christen, H.T. (2003). Terrorism response: field guide for fire and EMS 
organizations. Upper Saddle River, N.J.; Prentice Hall.
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0711/2003275909.html]
Marmiroli, N. (et al.,) (2007). Advanced science and technology for biological decontamination 
of sites affected by chemical and radiological nuclear agents. [Proceedings of the NATO 
Advanced Study Instititute on Advanced Science and Technology for Biological 
Decontamination of Sites Affected by Chemical and Radiological Nuclear Agents, Zhitomir, 
Ukraine, 17-28 August 2005]Dordrecht: Springer.
 [*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0825/2007943836-t.html]
Mauroni, A. J. (2006). Where are the WMDs: the reality of chem-bio threats on the home front 
and the battlefront. Annapolis, Md.; Naval Institute Press.
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip066/2005037935.html]
McFee, R.B. & Leikin, J.B. (Eds.,) (2008). Toxico-terrorism: emergency response and clinical 
approach to chemical, biological, and radiological agents. New York; McGraw-Hill, Health 
Professions Division. 
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0708/2007005124-t.html]
McIsaac, J.H. (Ed.,) (2006). Hospital preparation for bioterror: a medical and biomedical 
systems approach. Amsterdam & Boston; Elsevier Academic Press.
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0634/2006011115-d.html]
Melnick, A.L. (2008). Biological, chemical, and radiological terrorism: emergency preparedness 
and response for the primary care physician. New York; London: Springer.
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0823/2007940366-t.html]
National Disaster Management Authority (India) (2007). National disaster management 
guidelines. Management of [type of disaster] In 6 vols. [1] Landslides and snow avalanches [2] 
Chemical (terrorism) disasters [3] Nuclear and radiological emergencies [4] Earthquakes [5] 
Cyclones [6] mergencies [4] Earthquakes [5] Cyclones [6]  Biological disasters. New Delhi: 
National Disaster Management Authority; Govt. of India. 
Phillips, T. A. (2008). Weapons of mass destruction: the threat of chemical, biological, and 
nuclear weapons. Berkeley Heights, NJ.; Enslow Publishers. 
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Prasad, K.N. (2008). Bio-shield: antioxidants against radiological, chemical and biological 
weapons. New York; Strategic Book Publishing.
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy1001/2009284481.html]
Ranstorp, M. & Normark, M. (Eds.,) (2009). Unconventional weapons and international 
terrorism: challenges and new approaches. London & New York; Routledge.
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0826/2008036719.html]
Read, R.J. & Sussman, J.L. (Eds.,) (2007). Evolving methods for macromolecular 
crystallography: the structural path to the understanding of the mechanisms of action of CBRN 
agents. Dordrecht; Springer Verlag.
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0802/2007475948.html]
Sanyasi, A. (2004). Extreme emergencies: humanitarian assistance to civilian populations 
following chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive incidents – a sourcebook. 
Rugby; ITDG.
Schreier, F. (2009). WMD proliferation: reforming the security sector to meet the threat. 
Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books. 
Smith, J. (2009). A law enforcement and security officers' guide to responding to bomb threats : 
providing a working knowledge of bombs, preparing for such incidents, and performing basic 
analysis of potential threats. Springfield, Ill.; Charles C Thomas.
Sheehan, M. A. (2008). Crush the cell: how to defeat terrorism without terrorizing ourselves. 
New York; Crown Publishers.
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip085/2007048444.html]
Terry, E. & Oxer, J. P. (2003). Survival handbook for chemical, biological, and radiological 
terrorism. Philadelphia, Pa.; Xlibris.
Theriault, J-M. & Jensen, J. O. (Eds.). Spectral sensing research for surface and air monitoring 
in chemical, biological and radiological defense and security applications. New Jersey; World 
Scientific.
Thurman, J.T. (2006). Practical bomb scene investigation. Boca Raton; CRC/Taylor & Francis. 
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip061/2005028445.html]
Urie, R.L. (2001). Gas masks and civil defense: a practical guide to biological, chemical, and 
radiological protection. Pine, CO.; Diomo Books.
Veenema, T.G. (2003). Disaster nursing and emergency preparedness for chemical, biological, 
and radiological terrorism and other hazards. New York: Springer Pub. Co.,
Veenema, T.G. ( 2009). Ready RN: handbook for disaster nursing and emergency preparedness. 
St. Louis, Mo.; Mosby/Elsevier.
PERSPECTIVES	 ﾠON	 ﾠTERRORISM	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Volume	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠIssue	 ﾠ5
60	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ November	 ﾠ2010[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0903/2008036566.html]
Wilkinson, P. (Ed.,) (2007). Homeland security in the UK: future preparedness for terrorist 
attack since 9/11. New York, NY.; Routledge.
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip077/2006102050.html]
Wingfield, W.E. (et al.,) (2009). Veterinary disaster medicine: working animals. Ames, Iowa: 
Wiley-Blackwell .
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0826/2008035482.html]
Woolard, D.L. & Jensen, J.L. (Eds.) (2008). Spectral sensing research for water monitoring 
applications and frontier science and technology for chemical, biological and radiological 
defense. Singapore; Hackensack, NJ.; World Scientific.
[*http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0904/2009278866.html]
Non-conventional Literature
Baines, P. (2007). Hazardous Materials: Chemical Biological Radiological; a review: 2004 to 
2007. [15th International Forensic Science Symposium] INTERPOL; Paris.
[http://www.interpol.int/Public/Forensic/IFSS/meeting15/Papers04.pdf] 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies. (2010). Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons 
and Materials of Mass Destruction. 
[http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/g8.pdf]
Central Intelligence Agency (2007). Terrorist CBRN. 
[http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/terrorist_cbrn/CBRN_threat.pdf]
Chalk, P. & Hoffman, B (et al.,) (2005). Trends in Terrorism; Threats to the United States and the 
Future of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. Santa Monica; RAND.
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG393.pdf]
Cilluffo, F.J. (et al.,) (2001). Combating chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
terrorism: a comprehensive strategy: a report of the CSIS Homeland Defense Project. 
Washington D.C.: CSIS. 
[http://www.survivalring.org/nbcprep/combatchembiorad.pdf]
Council of Europe. Committee of Experts on Terrorism. (2007). Profiles on counter-terrorist 
capacity: United Kingdom. 
[http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/fight_against_terrorism/4_theme_files/
apologie_-_incitement/CODEXTER%20Profiles%20(2007)%20UK%20E.pdf]
PERSPECTIVES	 ﾠON	 ﾠTERRORISM	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Volume	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠIssue	 ﾠ5
61	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ November	 ﾠ2010Dixon, L.S. (et al.,) (2007). Trade-offs among alternative government interventions in the market 
for terrorism insurance: interim results. Santa Monica, Calif.; RAND.
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2007/RAND_DB525.pdf]
Doesburg, J.C. (2004). Changes in CBRN Threat. U.S. Army RDE Command.
[http://proceedings.ndia.org/430C/john_doesburg.pdf]
European Conference of Ministers of Transport - ECMT (2005). Container Transport Security 
Across Modes. OECD; Paris.
[http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/europe/ecmt/pubpdf/05ContainerSec.pdf]
Fradkin, H., Haqqani, H. & Brown, E. (2004). Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. Hudson 
Institute. 
[http://www.e-prism.org/images/Paz..pdf]
Frisell, E.H & Oredsson, M. (2006). Building Crisis Management Capacity in the EU. Defense 
Research Agency (FOI); Stockholm, Sweden.
[http://www.foi.se/upload/ASEK/foir1920_building_crisis_management.pdf]
Grlicarev, I. (2008). Emergency preparedness and response to 'Not-in-a-Facility' radiological 
accidents. [Source: IRPA 12: 12. International Congress of the International Radiation Protection 
Association (IRPA)]
[http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/41/092/41092742.pdf]
HHS Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (U.S.) (2007).
HHS Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise strategy and 
implementation plan for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. 
Washington, DC (330 Independence Ave., SW, Washington 20201)
[http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/boards/nbsb/meetings/Documents/nbsb-mcmreport.pdf]
International Atomic Energy Ageny (IAEA) (2006). Member State Responsibilities according to 
International Conventions.
[www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/41/067/41067369.pdf]
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (2006). The IAEA Nuclear Security Programme 
Combating Nuclear Terrorism.
[www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/41/067/41067362.pdf]
International Student Model United Nations (2010). Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending Against Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats. [Thesis,University of Macedonia, 
Thessaloniki, Greece]
[http://www.thessismun.org/2010/documentation/study_guides/NAC-SG1.pdf]
PERSPECTIVES	 ﾠON	 ﾠTERRORISM	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Volume	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠIssue	 ﾠ5
62	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ November	 ﾠ2010International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (2006). Response to Illicit Trafficking of 
Radioactive Materials. 
[www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/41/067/41067370.pdf]
Lasker, R.D. (2004). Redefining Readiness: terrorism planned through the eyes of the public. 
New York, N.Y.; New York Academy of Medicine. 
[http://tap.gallaudet.edu/emergency/nov05conference/EmergencyReports/
RedefiningReadinessStudy.pdf]
McConnell, J.M. (2008). Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community. Senate 
Armed Services  Committee. 
[http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2008/February/McConnell%2002-27-08.pdf]
Moore, G.M. (2010). International Legal Framework for Nuclear Security. IAEA; Vienna. 
[www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/41/061/41061875.pdf]
Mwandime, C. (2008). Country Presentation on Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials.
IAEA; Vienna. 
[www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/41/067/41067359.pdf ] 
Ramseger, A., Kalinowski, M.B. & Weiss, L. (2009). CBRN Threats and the Economic
Analysis of Terrorism. 
[www.znf.uni-hamburg.de/OcPaper_No10.pdf]
Reiter, D. (2006). Preventive war and its alternatives: the lessons of history. Strategic Studies 
Institute. 
[http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub651.pdf]
Reuven, P. (2005). Global Jihad and WMD: Between Martyrdom and Mass Destruction. 
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S)
[http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-502.pdf]
Stambaugh, H. (et al.,) (2009). An airport guide for regional emergency planning for CBRNE 
events. Washington, D.C.: Transportation Research Board.
[http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/acrp/acrp_rpt_012.pdf]
Storch, D. & Kenzelmann, M. (2008). Strategy for responding to nuclear, radiological, 
biological and chemical threats in Switzerland [ABC- Protection in Switzerland was originally 
set up primarily for protection against military weapons of mass destruction, such as atomic/
nuclear or chemical weapons. Protection against biological weapons..].
[IRPA 12: 12. International congress of the International Radiation Protection Association - 
IRPA] 
PERSPECTIVES	 ﾠON	 ﾠTERRORISM	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Volume	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠIssue	 ﾠ5
63	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ November	 ﾠ2010[www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/41/092/41092722.pdf ]  
United Kingdom. Secretary of State for the Home Department. Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare; 
The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism. 
[http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm78/7833/7833.pdf]
United Nations Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force – CTITF (2010). 
Interagency Coordination in the Event of a Nuclear or Radiological Terrorist Attack: Current 
Status, Future Prospects. New York: UN.
[http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/10-48863%20CTITF%20WMD%20Working%20Group
%20Report%20Interagency%20coordination%20web.pdf]
United States. Dept. of Defense. Office of Force Transformation. (2003). Military 
transformation :a strategic approach.
[http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/transformation/military-transformation-a-strategic-
approach.pdf]
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency.(2002). Are you ready? a guide to citizen 
preparedness. Washington, DC.; Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[http://federalhandbooks.lettercarriernetwork.info/A%20Guide%20to%20Citizen
%20Preparedness.pdf]
US Army Training and Doctrine Command. (2007). Terrorism and WMD; in the Contemporary 
Operational Environment. 
[www.fas.org/irp/threat/terrorism/sup4.pdf]
Prime Journal Articles
Arpad P. (2003). Weapon system selection and mass-casualty outcomes. Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 15 (2, June) pp.81-95.
Becker, S. M. (2009) Preparing for terrorism involving radioactive materials: three lessons from 
recent experience and research. Journal of Applied Security Research. 4 (1) pp.9-20
Blos, M. (et al.,) (2009). The threat of outsourcing US ports operation to any terrorist country 
supporter: a case study using fault tree analysis. International Journal of Information and 
Decision Sciences, 1 (4, 10 August), pp.411-427.
Bulkeley, J. C. (2007) Decontamination and remediation after a dirty bomb attack; technical and 
political challenges. The Nonproliferation Review. 14 (1), pp.113-138 
Bunn, M. (2009). Nuclear bomb squad - looking for a nuclear needle in the haystack. The 
Nonproliferation Review. 16 (3), pp.533 -538.
Cone, D. (et al.,) (2008). Pilot test of a proposed Chemical/Biological/Radiation/ Nuclear-
Capable Mass Casualty Triage System. Prehospital Emergency Care, 1, (2, April), pp. 236-240.
PERSPECTIVES	 ﾠON	 ﾠTERRORISM	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Volume	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠIssue	 ﾠ5
64	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ November	 ﾠ2010Carpintero-Santamaría, N. (2010). The incidence of illegal nuclear trafficking in proliferation 
and international security. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression. 
[*http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/19434472.2010.512156]
Chalk, P. (2007). Trends in transnational terrorism and implications for U.S. National Security 
and U.S. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30, (9, September), 
pp.767-776.
Chaput, C. (et al.,) (2007). Disaster training for pre-hospital providers. Pre-hospital Emergency 
Care, 11, (4, October) pp.458-465. 
Chyba, C. (2001) Biological terrorism and public health. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy. 
43 (1), pp.93-106.
Coirier, W. (et al.,) (2005). A computational fluid dynamics approach for urban area transport and 
dispersion modeling. Environmental Fluid Mechanics, 5 (5, October), pp. 443-479.
Cooper, H. H. A. (2006). All bombs are dirty, but some are more dirty than others. Journal of 
Police Crisis Negotiations. 6(2), pp.3-16
Corr, A. (2005) Deterrence of Nuclear Terror; a negligence doctrine. The Nonproliferation 
Review. 12 (1), pp. 127-147.
Currie, J., Caseman, D. & Renee, A.T. (2009). The evaluation of CBRN canisters for use by 
firefighters during overhaul. Annals of Occupational Hygiene, 53 (5, 27 July), pp.523-538.
Cwojdzinski, D. (et al.) (2007). Kontaminationsverdacht: Erstmaßnahmen in der Notaufnahme. 
Notfall & Rettungsmedizin, 10 (5, August), pp.336-342.
Davis, S. & McHenry, K. (2005). A retrospective analysis of mass casualty presentation resulting 
from the release of toxic chemicals. International Journal of Emergency Management, 2 (3, 11 
July), pp.231-238.
Desouza, K. C. & Lau, K. A. (2008). Managing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: 
an information management perspective. International Journal of Public Administration. 31 
(13), pp.1457-1512.
Difilippo, A. (2003). Japan's anti-nuclear weapons policy misses its target, even in the war on 
terrorism. Medicine, Conflict and Survival. 19 (3), pp.235-248.
Eisenkraft, A. (et al.) (2009). Phase I study of a topical skin protectant against chemical warfare 
agents. Military Medicine, 174 (1, January), pp.47-52.
Eisenman,  D.  P.  (et  al.,)  (2005).  Terrorism's  psychologic  effects  and  their  implications  for 
primary pare  policy, research,  and  education.  Journal  of  General  Internal  Medicine,  20  (8, 
August), pp.772-776.
Ellingsen, S. A. (2008). Strengthening the second line of defense. The Nonproliferation Review. 
15 (2), pp.399-402.
PERSPECTIVES	 ﾠON	 ﾠTERRORISM	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Volume	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠIssue	 ﾠ5
65	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ November	 ﾠ2010Etchegary, H. (et al.) (2008). Canadians' representation of chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) terrorism: a content analysis. Human and Ecological Risk 
Assessment: An International Journal. 14 (3), pp.479-494.
Gao, P. (et al.) (2007). Review of chamber design requirements for testing of personal protective 
clothing ensembles. Journal of Occupational and Environmental Hygiene, 4 (8, June), pp.
562-571.
Gressang, D.  (2001) Audience and message: assessing terrorist WMD potential. Terrorism and 
Political Violence. 13 (3), pp.83-106.
Hansell, C. (2008). Nuclear medicines’s double double hazard - imperiled treatment and the risk 
of terrorism. The Nonproliferation Review. 15(2), pp.185-208.
[http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/152_hansell_nuclear_medicine.pdf]
Hansell, C.  (2008). Practical steps towards a world without civilian HEU. The Nonproliferation 
Review. 15 (2), pp.289-310.
Hochstein, C. (et al.) (2008). Selected resources for emergency and disaster preparedness and 
response from the United States National Library of Medicine. Medical Reference Services 
Quarterly. 27 (1) , pp. 1-20.
Hoffman, B. (2009) The first non-state use of a chemical weapon in warfare: the Tamil Tigers' 
assault on East Kiran. Small Wars & Insurgencies. 20 (3), pp.463-677.
Hopkins, M. F. (2008).Teaching and Research on the Cold War in the United Kingdom. Cold 
War History. 8 (2), pp.241-258.
Ivanova, K. & Sandler, T. (2007). CBRN Attack Perpetrators: an Empirical Study. Foreign 
Policy Analysis, 3 (4, October), pp.273-294.
Karam, P. A. (2005). Radiological terrorism. Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An 
International Journal. 11 (3), pp.501-523.
Khripunov, I. (2006). The social and psychological impact of  radiological terrorism. The 
Nonproliferation Review. 13 (2) pp.275-316
Kmec, M. (2003) Bioterrorism internet resources for consumers. Journal of Consumer Health 
On the Internet. 7 (4), pp.53-60.
Lane, R. (2004). NATO transformation: the development of a CBRN defence capability. The 
RUSI Journal, 149 (4, 1 August), pp.40-41. 
Leitenberg, M. (2009). The self-fulfilling prophecy of bioterrorism. The Nonproliferation 
Review. 16 (1), pp.95-109. 
Lemyre, L. (et al.,) (2007). Differential perception of chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear terrorism in Canada. International Journal of Risk Assessment and Management, 7 (8, 2 
October), pp.1191-1208.
PERSPECTIVES	 ﾠON	 ﾠTERRORISM	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Volume	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠIssue	 ﾠ5
66	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ November	 ﾠ2010Lien, F. S. (et al.) (2006). Progress and challenges in the development of physically-based 
numerical models for prediction of flow and contaminant dispersion in the urban environment. 
International Journal of Computational Fluid Dynamics, 20, (5, June), pp. 323-337.
Lugar, R.G. (2008). Reviving up the cooperative nonproliferation engine. The Nonproliferation 
Review. 15 (2), pp.349- 352. 
[http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/152_viewpoint_lugar.pdf]
Martin, B. (2007). Nuclear power and antiterrorism: obscuring the policy contradictions. 
Prometheus: Critical Studies in Innovation. 25 (1), pp.19-29.
Mattox, J.M. (2010). Nuclear terrorism: the ‘Other’ extreme of irregular warfare. Journal of 
Military Ethics. 9 (2), pp.160-176.
Mauroni, A.J. (2010) Homeland Insecurity: Thinking About CBRN Terrorism. 
Homeland Security Affairs, Vol.VI, (3, September), pp.1-17.
Miller, M. (2007) Nuclear attribution as deterrence. The Nonproliferation Review. 14 (1), pp.
33-60. 
[http://www.hsaj.org/pages/volume6/issue3/pdfs/6.3.3.pdf]
Mohtadi, H. & Panini, A. (2009). Risk Analysis of chemical, biological, or radionuclear threats: 
implications for food security. Risk Analysis, 29, (9, September), pp. 1317-1335.
Paltin, D. M. (2003).Chemical and biological violence; predictive patterns in State and terrorist 
behavior. Journal of Threat Assessment.. 2 (3), pp.41-68.
Potter, W. C. (2008). Nuclear terrorism and the global politics of civilan HlEU elimination. The 
Nonproliferation Review. 15 (2), pp.135-158.
Quillen C.(2002). A Historical Analysis of Mass Casualty Bombers. Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 25 (5, 1 September), pp.279-292.
Regens, J. L. & Gunter, J.T. (2010). Predicting the magnitude and spatial distribution of 
potentially exposed populations during IND or RDD terrorism incidents. Human and Ecological 
Risk Assessment: An International Journal. 16 (2), pp.236-250.
Roberts, G. B. (2009). Hostis humani generis: the threat of WMD terrorism and how NATO is 
facing the ultimate threat. Defence Against Terrorism Review. 2, (1, Spring), pp. 1-13 [http://
www.tmmm.tsk.tr/publications/datr3/01_Guy%20Roberts.pdf]
Rogers, M. (et al.,) (2007) Mediating the social and psychological impacts of terrorist attacks: 
The role of risk perception and risk communication. International Review of Psychiatry, 19, (3, 
June), pp.279-288.
Romano, J. A. & King, J. M. (2002). Chemical warfare and chemical terrorism: psychological 
and performance outcomes. Military Psychology. 14 (2), pp.85-92
PERSPECTIVES	 ﾠON	 ﾠTERRORISM	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Volume	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠIssue	 ﾠ5
67	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ November	 ﾠ2010Salama, S. & Hansell, L. (2005). Does intent equal capability? Al-Qaeda and weapons of mass 
destruction. The Nonproliferation Review. 12 (3), pp.615-653. 
Sidel, V. W. (2003). Bioterrorism in the United States: a balanced assessment of risk and 
response. Medicine, Conflict and Survival. 19 (4), pp.318-325.
Sinai, J. (2005). Forecasting terrorists' likelihood to embark on “Conventional” to CBRN 
warfare. The International Studies Review, 7 (1, March), pp.151-153.
Srikrishna, D. (et al.) (2005). Deterrence of nuclear terrorism with mobile radiation defectors. 
The Nonproliferation Review. 12 (3), pp.573-614.
Stavroulakis, P. & Stavroulakis, S. (2008). International Journal of Technology Transfer and 
Commercialisation, 7, (1, 18 June), pp.68-82.
Streeper, C. (2010). Preventing dirty bombs; addressing the threat at the "Source". The 
Nonproliferation Review. 17 (3), pp.531-550.
Sullivan, T.J. & Perry, W.L. (2004). Identifying indicators of chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear (CBRN) weapons development activity in sub-national terrorist groups. Journal of 
the Operational Research Society, 55 (4, April), pp.361-374. 
Swartz, B. J. (2001). Nuclear terrorism - a selection of internet resources. Internet Reference 
Services Quarterly. 6 (3), pp. 7-98.
Tarvainen, T. (2007-8). NATO and the CBRN terrorism - mission: an overview. Journal of 
Security Issues 2(1), pp.24-47.
[http://www.jsiss.net/vols/vol2/Vol2.No1.Art2.pdf]
Tucker, D. (2001). What is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is It?
Terrorism and Political Violence. 13 (3), pp.1-14.
Wilson, R.M. (2008). An overview of U.S. initiatives and technologies to secure shipping 
containers at overseas ports. Journal of Applied Security Research. 3 (2), pp.241-267.
PERSPECTIVES	 ﾠON	 ﾠTERRORISM	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Volume	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠIssue	 ﾠ5
68	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ November	 ﾠ2010Book Reviews
Alison Pargeter. The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition
London: Saqi, 2010. 300 pp.  ISBN: 978-0863564758 (hbk). £20. Reviewed by Richard 
Phelps 
The Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin), founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-
Banna, is a controversial organisation precisely due to its ambiguity. It is vocal, yet secretive; it 
is transnational and led by one 'General Guide', but has a different history in each country; it is 
said to be non-violent, but often endorses violence. The group seeks to contest elections, yet is 
far from internally democratic and would prefer to exclude Christians and women from being a 
country's president. Amid this incertitude, this highly lucid and approachable analysis of the 
Brotherhood offers a welcome degree of clarity. It is not another Egyptian-centric history of the 
movement; instead, Alison Pargeter (University of Cambridge) offers a more global picture of 
the trajectories the movement has taken in the Arab world and in Europe. Based on important 
internal documents, and - crucially - a remarkable array of on-the-record interviews with senior 
Brotherhood personnel, Pargeter allows the Brothers to do much of the talking. 
The relationship between Syria and the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, captures many of the 
organisation's paradoxes. Unlike in Egypt, where the Brethren represent the deepest-rooted 
opposition to the regime and to its relationship with Israel, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood can 
hardly play the 'Palestine card' against a regime that for decades has been at war with Israel and 
championed the Palestinians' armed struggle. Nor do the Syrian Ikhwan represent an entrenched 
opposition to the Asad regime. Beyond the events that culminated in the regime's assault on the 
city of Hama in February 1982, the Brotherhood's history in Syria is little-known. Pargeter's 
chapter adds much to the scarce literature on the topic by examining the internal dynamics of the 
movement. After being crushed at the cost of tens of thousands of lives in Hama, Syria's 
Islamists have been an opposition in exile, increasingly alienated from politics inside the country. 
In a marriage of convenience, they even joined forces with defectors from the secular Ba'thist 
regime, such as the disaffected former vice president 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam at one time. 
Whilst elsewhere the Brotherhood’s objective may be to win power, the Syrian Brotherhood’s 
priority is to engineer a return from exile. 
At the same time though, the Asad regime plays host to a pantheon of Islamist organisations 
from abroad such as Hamas, Hizballah and Islamic Jihad, welcomed by Damascus as disruptive 
assets in the service of Syrian foreign policy. Herein lies one salient feature of politics in the 
Arab world: regimes that tolerate minimal dissent from their own Islamists often play host to 
dissenters unwelcome elsewhere. Many of Syria's Brethren were welcomed in Jordan and Iraq, 
many of Egypt's were welcomed in Saudi Arabia, and many from all Arab states have found 
refuge in Europe. 
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authoritarian regimes, many of its activists have found refuge in Western democracies. Yet being 
a challenger to a despot does not make one a democrat. Whereas in the Arab world the 
Brotherhood's members represent sizeable constituencies in societies that are often un-
enfranchised but should not be ignored, in Europe the opposite is often true. Here, though vocal, 
the Brotherhood does not represent the bulk of European Muslims but nevertheless receives a 
disproportionate amount of limelight. It is predominantly an organisation of the Arab educated 
classes, whilst most British Muslims, for example, are of South Asian origin and most German 
Muslims are of Turkish origin. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood’s advocates market themselves as 
responsible interlocutors, while often remaining cagey about their precise relationship to the 
Brotherhood’s ideology. 
The Brotherhood's slipperiness has made it its own worst enemy. It disavows the revolutionary 
urgency of its best-known martyr, Sayyid Qutb; yet as its most accomplished ideologue he is too 
prominent to be rejected wholesale. Nor has any other Brotherhood ideologue been able to 
surpass Qutb; in fact the most sophisticated Islamist thinkers have tended to move away from the 
Brotherhood. It likewise presents itself as a bulwark against Al-Qaeda's militancy, yet it also 
advocates violent jihad in defence of Muslims in Iraq, Palestine and elsewhere. Its populism 
provokes anxiety. Committed militants see the Brotherhood as opportunists who cynically 
champion popular issues simply to rivet themselves to their popularity without ever actually 
standing in the frontline. In this way, the General Guide's promise to send 10,000 volunteers to 
defend Lebanon from the Israeli invasion in 2006 was nothing but flimsy bombast. Its practical 
role in supporting the Palestinian armed struggle or the Iraqi resistance has been minimal. On the 
other hand, endorsing violence whilst presenting itself as the face of 'moderation' and agitating 
for electoral participation – all this has encouraged its critics to view it as a Trojan horse 
opportunistically exploiting democratic electoral mechanisms whilst remaining profoundly 
undemocratic. 
Such flak is not without substance. Pargeter rejects the argument that supporting the Brotherhood 
can serve as a vaccine that can preclude violent extremism. Experience shows that the reverse is 
true, she claims. In her exploration of issues that are both murky and subtle, the author treads 
carefully. The book’s value lies in showing how experiences differ from country to country: e.g. 
during the Gulf War many branches of the Brotherhood appealed to popular sentiments and 
vocally denounced the American intervention, yet the Kuwaiti Brotherhood saw this as a colossal 
betrayal and even suspended its international affiliation. The movement’s populism and 
sloganeering that 'Islam is the solution' account for the Brethren's longevity and popularity as 
much as its Janus-faced nature. Be it democracy, charity, or violence, whatever the Brotherhood 
does itself commit to, there are others from its ranks or surrounding who push such commitments 
further. Throughout the last century, the Brotherhood was an influential piece of political 
furniture in the Arab world. There is no sign of it dissipating; yet as time goes on and the 
organisation itself develops in different directions, uncertainty will doubtless persist as to the 
‘true’ face of the Muslim Brotherhood.
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US $ 27.99 Reviewed by Alex P. Schmid
The sad truth about terrorism research  is that  99% of all those who write about the subject have 
never talked to a terrorist, not even an imprisoned one. There are a few exceptions and the author 
of this ambitious volume, Scott Atran, is one. He is an anthropologist by training. While 
anthropology’s  main method of investigation  - “participatory observation” - should not be taken 
too literally when it comes to the field of terrorism studies, it gets the investigator as close to his 
object of study as one can get without “going native”. As Atran puts it: “It is possible to 
empathize with jihadi warriors and believers without needing to sympathize or share their 
conviction” (p.36) There are plenty of obstacles and dangers that face the inquisitive researcher, 
including being kidnapped for ransom or murdered for  impressing some third party. Scott Atran 
is a maverick researcher with  institutional academic affiliations in both France and the United 
States . He has followed terrorists in  Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, as well as in 
courtrooms in Europe. His book is not primarily written for fellow-academics but is meant for a 
broader public.
 In ‘Talking to the Enemy’ , Atran tries to combine a macro-perspective on the origins of 
conflicts that have produced terrorism with  micro-portraits taken on the ground in conversations 
with terrorists and their supporters. Doing such a splits makes the volume less than perfect in 
terms of composition. His macro-perspectives with brief excursions into centuries of history are 
not the volumes strongest features. Yet where the book excels is in the portrait of the 
anthropologist at work; it gives us a unique glimpse into the practice of an academic professional 
engaged in fieldwork.  Traditionally, anthropologists have studied kin and tribal networks. It so 
happens that family networks (and neighbourhood- and school-based ties) are also a key to 
understanding many terrorist networks. He notes that in some jihadist circles “friends tend to 
marry one another’s sisters and cousins” (p.36).  At times, Atran’s findings stand in sharp 
opposition to mainstream assumptions on salafist jihadi terrorism. For example, he writes: ”The 
idea that joining jihad is a carefully calculated decision or that people are ‘brainwashed’ or 
‘recruited’ into ‘cells’ or ‘councils’ by ‘organizations’ with ‘infrastructures’ that can be hit and 
destroyed is generally wrong” (p.50) . Or: “….there’s no indication that Al Qaeda ever had the 
capability to acquire such  weapons [of mass destruction, AS], and it has such ability much less 
now than before” (p.101). He is, however, less certain about Lashkar –e- Toiba, whose spiritual 
leader Hafiz Saeed declared that “mass  killing of nonbelievers is the only solution to 
international conflicts in the Muslims’ favor”(p.236). 
At times Atran’s  method of investigation is reminiscent of investigative reporters. In his 
judgments he is not afraid of reaching definitive conclusions. For instance, regarding the Madrid 
bombing of 11 March 2004, he writes: ”The Madrid plot was incubated by a hodgepodge of 
childhood friends, teenage buddies, neighborhood pals, prison cellmates, siblings, cousins and 
lovers. These weren’t careful, well-trained commandos. They were almost laughably 
incompetent, though tragically only a bit less so than Spanish law enforcement and 
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to the Taliban in the summer of 2009 that “We and our Afghan allies stand ready to welcome 
anyone supporting the Taliban who renounces Al-Qaeda, lays down their arms….etc.” , he dryly 
notes: ”To get the tribesmen to lay down arms …is about as farfetched as getting the [US]
National Rifle Association to support a constitutional repeal of Americans’ right to bear arms. 
Moreover, as Marc Sageman observes, ”there’ s no Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and no Afghans in 
Al Qaeda” (p.258). The book arrives at a number of  conclusions that  contradict mainstream 
views. With reference to the situation in Europe, he notes:  “Generally…people go looking for Al 
Qaeda, not the other way round”.(…) The overwhelming majority have not had sustained prior 
religious education but have become “born again” into radial Islam in their late  teens and early 
twenties ”. (p.272) The last section of the book looks at the role of religion in terrorism. Despite 
being a confessed atheist himself, Atran does not come down harshly on religion, noting that 
“Islam and religious ideology per se aren’t the principal causes of suicide bombing and terror in 
today’s world….”(p.425). What, in his view, inspires terrorists is “a thrilling experience and call 
to action that promises glory and esteem in the eyes of friends, and, through friends, eternal 
respect and remembrance in the wider world that they will never live to enjoy.” Yet he also 
reminds those who seek such glory:” Because the young, feeling immortal, do not fathom how 
short and fragile life and memory are – even remembrance of heroes – or how forever long are 
death and forgetfulness. They don’t understand that their deaths are staged so that stories will be 
broadcast, not about them – they are as nameless as their victims – but about the Cause” (p.483). 
Atran has given us a remarkably honest book, demonstrating that down-to-earth field work can 
give us a far superior understanding of what makes terrorists “tick” than whole armies of 
armchair counter-terrorist ‘experts’  from profit-oriented consultancy firms eager to get their 
funding from often clueless  Homeland Security bureaucrats.
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them to:
• present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms 
of  violent conflict; 
• submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and 
analyses; 
• use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on  issues related to the above. 
Perspectives on Terrorism (PT) could be characterized as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses 
with some of the traditional rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles 
can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than fee-
based subscription journals.  Our on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of 
flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles  - but without compromising 
professional scholarly standards. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT is not supporting any 
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